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Abstract 
Demand response is defined as the modification of consumption pattern in reaction to an 
external signal providing a service within the energy system. It has been recognized as 
having substantial efficiency potential as part of the liberalized energy markets.  The study 
examines the introduction of demand response in the Nordic electricity markets, aiming 
at fluent adoption of this resource while obtaining the most profitable outcome concern-
ing the net welfare. The study focuses on three main challenges; a suitable market model, 
verification, as well as the valuation and net benefits of demand response.  
 
Regarding the market model, the main challenge is defining an optimal mode of opera-
tions for the demand response markets. The main question concerns the adoption of sep-
arate third party aggregators, independent actors, which would be allowed to collect to-
gether a group of flexible consumers and offer their demand reduction to the markets 
without the consent of the customers’ supplier. There is a risk of creating unfair balancing 
costs to the supplier, which can be resolved by the design of the model. The different pos-
sible market configurations were analysed based on their suitability and their effect. The 
optimal solution was discovered to be a combination of selected models, allowing the par-
ticipation of a wide range of resources. This encourages competition, which was found 
essential in achieving the full potential of demand response. 
 
The compensation for demand response is based on the reduced consumption, so there is 
a need for exact measurement. Demand response is the difference between the normal 
consumption level that never occurred and the actualized consumption. The most accu-
rate method was discovered to be using a rolling average with some circumstantial cor-
rection to create a baseline, which can then be used in calculating the amount of response. 
 
It was discovered that paying full market price for demand response is essential in achiev-
ing the desired level of demand response. At the same time, this can create some efficiency 
losses and adverse effects to the suppliers which is why the net benefits should be inves-
tigated more thoroughly. The study concluded that demand response can have a negative 
net effect depending on the situation, and using mathematical net benefit estimation 
methods for limiting detrimental flexibility bids seems plausible. 
 
Demand response should be considered as a utility suitable for some situations instead of 
a comprehensive solution for market inefficiencies. This highlights the importance of as-
sessing the overall effects before applying any changes in the current market structure. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Kysyntäjousto tarkoittaa kulutuksen muuttamista ulkoisen signaalin ohjaamana, tuot-
taen samalla hyötyä energiajärjestelmälle. Sen potentiaali arvioidaan erittäin suureksi tu-
levaisuuden sähkömarkkinoiden tehokkuuden kannalta. Tämä tutkimus keskittyy kysyn-
täjouston käyttöönottoon Pohjoismaiden sähkömarkkinoilla siten, että kaikki järjestel-
män tarjoamat hyödyt saataisiin hyödynnettyä mahdollisimman hyvin. Työ keskittyy kol-
meen päähaasteeseen; markkinamallin kehittämiseen, jouston mittaamiseen ja jouston 
arvon, sekä kokonaishyödyn arviointiin. 
 
Markkinamallin kannalta keskeisin haaste on määrittää optimaalinen toimintatapa ky-
syntäjouston kannalta. Yksi keskeisin kysymyksistä koskee kolmannen osapuolen aggre-
gaattoreita, itsenäisiä toimijoita jotka kokoavat yhteen usean joustoon kykenevän kulu-
tusyksikön jouston ja tarjoavat sitä markkinoille riippumatta näiden kuluttajien sähkön-
myyjän toiveista. Toimintatapaan liittyy riski siitä, että samalla aiheutetaan epäoikeuden-
mukainen tasevirhe ja siten myös kulu sähkön toimittajalle. Tämä virhe pystytään kuiten-
kin ratkaisemaan markkinamallin suunnittelulla. Vaihtoehtoisia markkinamalleja arvioi-
tiin niiden soveltuvuuden ja vaikutusten mukaan, ja optimaalisimmaksi vaihtoehdoksi 
tunnistettiin yhdistelmä toimintatapoja, joka mahdollistaa useiden erilaisten toimijoiden 
osallistumisen. Tämän nähtiin edistävän kilpailua, mitä pidetään edellytyksenä kysyntä-
jouston täyden hyödyn saavuttamisessa. 
 
Kysyntäjouston kompensaatiot perustuvat kulutuksen vähentämiseen, joten tarvitaan 
tarkka metodi tämän vähennyksen mittaamiseksi, sillä kysyntäjousto on erotus normaa-
lin toteutumattoman kulutustason ja toteutuneen kulutuksen välillä. Tarkimmaksi meto-
diksi arvioidaan rullaavan keskiarvomenetelmän avulla laskettu vertailukulutuskäyrä, 
jota tarkennetaan esimerkiksi säähän tai vuodenaikaan liittyvillä korjaustermeillä. 
 
Tutkimus selvitti että täyden markkinahinnan maksaminen kysyntäjoustosta on tarpeen 
jouston tarvittavan määrän aikaansaamiseksi. Tämän todetaan kuitenkin aiheuttavan te-
hokkuustappiota ja haittoja, minkä johdosta jouston kokonaisvaikutuksia tulisi tutkia tar-
kemmin. Työssä todetaan, että kysyntäjoustolla voi olla negatiivinen nettovaikutus, ja on-
kin suositeltavaa käyttää kokonaishyötyä arvioivia matemaattisia metodeja, joiden perus-
teella haitallisten joustotarjousten täytäntöönpanoa voidaan rajoittaa. 
 
Kysyntäjoustoa ei tulisi tarkastella kokonaisvaltaisena ratkaisuna markkinoiden tehotto-
muuteen, vaan tiettyihin tilanteisiin soveltuvana hyödykkeenä, korostaen tarvetta arvi-
oida kokonaisvaikutuksia ennen nykyisen markkinarakenteen muuttamista. 
 
Avainsanat Kysyntäjousto, aggregointi, sähkömarkkinat, sääntely,  
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1 Introduction 
The liberalization of European energy markets, functional international trade of energy 
between the Nordic countries and the continuous improvements in transmission capacity 
have led to a more appropriate use of the territorial energy production resources. The 
European Union’s third Energy Package aims at improving the functionality of the EU’s 
internal energy market (The European Commission 2015). On a national scale this has 
resulted in dismantling of excessive production capacity. At the same time some renew-
able energy production methods are being heavily subsidized. As a combined result of 
these, electricity market prices have declined, having a profound effect the profitability 
of condensing power production. We are facing a situation, where the amount of conven-
tional energy production capacity is declining and the supply of renewable energy is in-
creasing.  
 
While this change in the markets has a positive effect on the environment diminishing the 
amount of emissions, shutting down of production capacity means that we are more often 
facing a situation, where the demand of electricity is approaching the maximum produc-
tion and import capacity. As a result of this, price spikes occur in the markets and at the 
worst case, the stability or reliability of the network can be threatened (NordPoolSpot 
2015b). Currently the main means to cope with these situations are production reserves, 
and flexible loads in some large consumption units controlled by the transmission system 
operator (TSO). These resources can resolve the issue of energy inadequacy, but they are 
only used as a last resort in abnormal situations and therefore do not act as a part of the 
daily electricity markets.  
 
Traditionally the European energy markets have been more focused on the supply of en-
ergy, while the full potential of the demand side of the markets has been underutilized. 
The European Commission is currently investigating efficient means for developing the 
energy markets to simultaneously match the energy needs as well as the decarbonizing 
targets. Enabling the end-users of electricity to actively adjust their consumption is esti-
mated to have a major effect in decreasing peak consumption in the Union scale. This 
means that the demand of energy in the European energy markets would also include the 
price-dependent demand of a large group of small end-users instead of considering them 
merely as a static consumption unit. This change would result in more functional markets, 
and the improved energy-efficiency would reduce the costs of maintaining the network 
as well as the need for investing in power production facilities (Conchado and Linares 
2010). (European Commission 2013, ACER 2014) 
 
It is evident that demand response will have a very central role in balancing the supply 
and demand of energy in the advanced energy grids of the future. The European Com-
mission has stated in numerous directives and other publications that empowering the 
end-users of energy to adjust their consumption according to price-signals will act as an 
important instrument in the grid of the future. In addition to these, free price formation 
and advanced energy markets encourage the adoption of demand-response, which is why 
it can be believed that the first large-scale changes will be seen in the Nordics. (European 
Commission 2012, European Commission 2009) The technology for wide adoption of 
consumer participation in the markets is available, but in order to reach the comprehen-
sive optimal end result, some unsolved issues regarding the market model and regulatory 
aspects have to be resolved. (European Commission 2012) 
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1.1 Definition of Demand Response 
In order to understand demand response, we have to be able to provide a concise defini-
tion of demand flexibility. Demand side flexibility (DSF) is a broader concept, under 
which demand response operates. Eurelectric specifies demand flexibility as “The modi-
fication of generation injection and/or consumption patterns in reaction to an external 
signal (price signal or activation) in order to provide a service within the energy system.” 
The parameters used to characterize flexibility in electricity include the amount of power 
modulation, the duration, the rate of change, the response time, the location etc. 
(Eurelectric 2014).” This definition is also used by European Commission´s Smart Grid 
Task force. (Smart Grid Task Force 2015)  
 
Several kind of activities can be recognized under the concept of demand flexibility. A 
frequently used classification is division between implicit and explicit DSF, which will 
also be applied in this thesis. Implicit DSF refers to a situation, where an end user is 
adjusting the demand of energy according to tariffs, which vary by time. (ACER 2014) 
In implicit DSF, flexibility is treated mainly in a static manner, because the response in 
demand can occur several hours after setting the price incentives. In implicit DSF, the 
time tariffs are commonly repetitive on a daily basis during certain hours, making the 
effect on the demand somewhat fixed instead of truly adjusting according to the current 
market situation. 
 
Explicit DSF, is when an end user is adjusting the demand of energy according to a signal, 
and is rewarded for this change. Explicit DSF operates often at the shortest timescales of 
response compared to implicit DSF, but in the case of real-time tariffs the distinction 
between these two can be blurred. Explicit DSF is also called demand side response 
(DSR), or demand response (DR) which is the expression that will be used in this thesis. 
(ACER 2014)  
 
The main difference between these two types of demand flexibility is hence the nature of 
control they have over adjusting the energy demand. Both means are capable of reducing 
or increasing the load, but as implicit DSF induces an uncontrollable reaction among the 
market participants, explicit demand response can accurately steer the demand at short 
time intervals. The amount of change induced by demand response in functional markets 
is in line with the current market needs, which makes it very suitable for the dynamic 
smart energy grids of the future. 
 
It is important to understand that demand response includes both demand reduction and 
increase as a response to the signal (Nguyen, Negnevitsky and de Groot 2011). In this 
thesis the subject will however be approached primarily from the viewpoint of load cur-
tailment, since the central incentive for the adoption of demand response is inadequate 
production capacity during peak hours and the potential positive impact DR would have 
on the market (European Commission 2013). Regardless of this viewpoint focusing on 
demand curtailment, demand response is not limited to merely limiting the use of energy 
by switching off energy consuming appliances. It can also consist of other means of ad-
justing the demand such as efficiency schemes, fuel substitution or embedded generation 
as long as the action serves as a response to the signal. (ACER 2014). 
 
In addition to the previous definitions, demand response can be divided into two separate 
forms; dispatchable and non-dispatchable. Dispatchable demand response means, that the 
flexibility is controlled by a system operator such as the transmission system operator 
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(TSO), independent system operator (ISO) or regional transmission organization (RSO). 
An example of dispatchable demand response would be an agreement between the end 
user of electricity and the system operator, which enables the operator to directly control 
the customer´s appliance in order to adjust consumption subject to a certain agreed price 
level or other method of compensation. In contrast to this, non-dispatchable demand re-
sponse is when the response of an end user cannot be enforced or monitored by a separate 
party such as the system operator. An example of this would be the real-time change of 
demand according to the price level in a system among customers, which are charged on 
an hourly basis. (International Energy Agency 2011) 
 
 
Figure 1. The different levels of demand side flexibility 
 
Demand response or DSF does not necessarily alter the amount of energy used in the long 
run, since it only alters the consumption pattern, moving the consumption from one point 
of time to another. After the periods of adjusting the demand according to the signal, a 
catch-up period can be observed (Palensky 2011). For instance, a water boiler can easily 
be switched off for one hour in order to avoid peaks of high demand without lowering the 
temperature too much. Regardless of this flexibility, the same amount of energy has to be 
used after the event to compensate for the switch-off period. Because of this, demand 
response typically does not save energy, and sometimes even a new peak can be generated 
as a rebound effect of the initial response (Palensky 2011). The fact that demand response 
does not decrease the amount of energy used by the consumers does not mean that it is 
unprofitable from an economic viewpoint. While it does not decrease the demand of en-
ergy, the declining demand of power during peak hours helps in avoiding the operation 
of expensive peak generation capacity as well as in minimizing the required investments 
in grid capacity. (International Energy Agency 2011)  
 
Traditionally, most of the demand response activities have focused on shifting the energy 
usage away from the most expensive peak hours in order to avoid costly operation, or 
investing in new small scale energy production facilities to be used during peaks. Re-
cently, however the activities have shifted towards incorporating the end user as an actual 
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independent actor in the markets, being able to choose whether to purchase energy or not 
depending on the current situation. (International Energy Agency 2011) 
 
1.2 Why do we Need Demand Response? 
The electricity networks are changing radically as we are gradually moving towards a 
bidirectional flow of energy instead of the traditional dispatchable energy generation 
where energy flows are directed merely from the big producers to the end users. Since the 
1990s, energy markets and power distribution systems have been deregulated and restruc-
tured in order to encourage competition in both energy production as well as retail mar-
kets. The aim has been in increasing efficiency, lowering the cost of energy and increasing 
customer participation in the markets. While the target has been improving the energy 
systems, this change has also had some negative effects on both energy markets and net-
works. The restructuring of local utilities into energy producers, TSO, retailer etc. can 
cause problems in maintaining the power supply and network, as the players are facing 
volatile prices and operating during times of peak demand. (Nguyen, Negnevitsky and de 
Groot 2011) Numerous independent actors in the field of energy production have identi-
fied demand response as a solution for this problem and a central part of the advanced 
energy markets and grids of the future. (European Commission 2012, International 
Energy Agency 2011).  
 
In addition to the transformation in the markets, we are currently witnessing the expansion 
of low-carbon generation. The continuous increase in photovoltaics, wind energy and 
small-scale energy production will result in a more complex energy system, which lowers 
the predictability of the energy production requirements. Solar and wind power produc-
tion facilities produce energy according to the climate, and cannot be controlled. At the 
same time, the system operators have to ensure that the generation of energy equals de-
mand in real time at any given moment in the electricity network. As the system is getting 
more complicated and the described changes increase volatility in the markets, balancing 
and production planning of energy is facing a challenge in how to respond to this new 
situation. (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) The emergence of alternating energy production 
capacity would not be a problem, if we were able to adjust the output of other energy 
production facilities according to the current situation. This however is impossible, since 
the majority of energy in Europe is produced in large facilities, which are unable to adjust 
their output, or in plants where it is not financially feasible such as nuclear and conven-
tional thermal power plants. (European Commission 2013) For this reason, demand re-
sponse and flexibility in general will be essential for the energy markets as well as the 
electricity grids of the future. 
 
The following Figure 2 displays the potential of demand as demand response is intro-
duced in the markets. Traditionally, the demand of electricity has been considered to be 
inelastic regardless of the price level. This is depicted as the vertical line. Elastic demand 
incorporating demand response is depicted as the sloped demand curve implying that 
there is variation in the amount of demand according to the price. The supply curve is 
based on the current power production capacity in the markets according to the production 
price. The two crossing points of these curves depict market equilibria in these two sce-
narios. As can be seen, introducing demand response results in lower pricing and reduced 
power output. On the other hand, the same illustration shows, how the absence of flexi-
bility can result in very high prices. (International Energy Agency 2011) A more detailed 
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elaboration of market economics and the functions of supply and demand curves can be 
found in Chapter 2.1. 
 
Figure 2. The potential of demand response in energy markets 
 
By observing the simplified graphic representation of elastic demand presented in Figure 
2, one can understand how demand response can provide major advantages on many lev-
els in the power markets if it is executed efficiently. Reducing demand during times of 
high demand such as long winter periods can allow the grid to operate reliably with lower 
reserve margins. As a result of this, In the long run demand response reduces investments 
in expensive generation capacity. The efficiency of price formation is improved, which 
results in lower prices. Including demand response in the market also makes it more dif-
ficult for a large market player to exercise market power. (International Energy Agency 
2011) The mechanism, how demand response can reduce is fairly easy to understand. It 
is however evident that the effect this change has on a market player varies according to 
the unique needs and aspirations of this actor. One way of mapping these potential bene-
fits is by classifying them by the market sector and the impact they have on the operation 
and expansion of the markets, which is presented in Figure 3 (Conchado and Linares 
2010). A detailed mapping of the market players can be found in Chapter 2.1.4. 
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Figure 3. The potential benefits of demand response. An elaboration based on (Conchado 
and Linares 2010) 
1.3 Approach and Methodology 
Demand response is a diverse concept, which combines features from regulation, market 
economics, legislation and technology. The whole scheme consists of multiple different 
parties, which have close influence to the actions of the others. The complexity of the 
research layout and the market composition calls for a pragmatic approach in order to 
achieve the desired results. 
 
Systems theory is defined as an interdisciplinary study of systems, aiming at discovering 
patterns and principles, which can be applied to all types of systems in all fields of re-
search. It is considered to be a pragmatic approach to the study of various organizational 
schemes. These schemes can be divided into three sub systems; closed systems, open 
systems and complex systems (Morgan 1997). Systems analysis is a formal study method, 
which aims at recognizing the optimal outcome or the proper course of action. The 
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method aims at recognizing the goals, limitations and options while assessing the possible 
outcomes regarding risk, expenses or benefits. (Bentley and Whitten 2006) The research 
approaches the subject by combining factors from both open and complex systems striv-
ing to clarify the optimal outcome of introducing demand response. Complex systems 
approach to scientific studies is based on examining the relationships between separate 
parts and how they form the collective behavior of a system as a whole, and how the 
system interacts with its environment. (Meadows 2008) What this means in terms of prac-
tice, is that the approach at solving complex problems should be based on reducing or 
constraining the complexity and analyzing these sections separately. This can be achieved 
by dividing the whole system into smaller separate parts and analyzing them separately. 
 
A comprehensive review of the market ecosystem is fundamental in applying systems 
theory, which is why an ample literature summary is presented on the Nordic electricity 
market features as well as the relevant market economics. This serves as the background 
of the study, on which the new market model is then built. The model is constructed by 
first dividing it into three separate main challenges. Each of these challenges is then ana-
lyzed reflecting them to the market fundamentals and aiming at the optimal outcome. In 
the end, the optimal outcomes of these three challenges are combined formulating a single 
market model, which serves as the recommendation for the regulative requirements in the 
adoption of demand response. 
 
This study combines the systems theory approach closely to regulatory economics, which 
provides the limitations and means to assess the outcome of the research. Regulatory eco-
nomics is determined as the study of legislative actions taken in order to minimize the 
effect of market failures or distortions. (P. Joskow 1989) In the case of electricity markets 
it can be seen as minimizing the market errors in order to protect and benefit the market 
participants. Special emphasis is put on reviewing the effects the regulation has on the 
economic welfare. (Barak 2012) (Adib and Hurlbut 2008) 
 
It should be noted that the reason for having demand response in the first place is, that we 
have retail pricing available for the commercial end-users, which in turn interferes with 
the electricity market structure. Customers do not face the actual market price, but instead 
a fixed retail price for the electricity, which then leads to distorted demand. What this 
means is that the regulators are in a sense actually disregarding a major error in the mar-
kets, and solving it by additional layers of regulative action and market structures. This 
situation is a result of the political willingness to maintain the retail electricity prices at a 
certain level, and can in fact be acceptable. At the same time it also changes the approach 
one has to take in addressing the issue. Due to the inherent errors in the markets, it might 
be difficult or even impossible to discover a flawless solution for the problem of intro-
ducing demand response in the markets. Hence, some disadvantages in the provided mar-
ket model can be considered to be acceptable. What this means regarding the approach of 
the study is that the reasoning and justification of the solution should emphasize the rel-
evance of the total economic welfare.  
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1.4 Scope of the Study 
Even though demand response is recognized as an essential part of the future grids and 
energy markets, the adoption of this technology has been low. Regardless of this, the 
regulatory authorities regarding energy production should have a stand on how to prepare 
for demand response. By examining the practices in existing flexibility markets, it is pos-
sible to prepare for this change in the markets, and form a suitable legislative framework 
before the actual adoption of this technology. In addition, this is most likely the only way 
to achieve an optimal outcome. 
 
This thesis is funded by the Finnish energy regulator, Energiavirasto. The focus of this 
study is thus in forming a Finnish regulatory framework for the Nordic energy markets. 
The Nordic energy markets consist of the liberalized wholesale electricity markets in Nor-
way, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Baltic countries. It should be noted, that the 
regulations may vary slightly depending on the market structure in question. 
 
In this thesis the focus is mainly on the wholesale and retail markets of electricity. There 
is currently no actual jurisdiction or a market model, which would incorporate the whole 
array of demand response services available for these open markets. Due to this, the pos-
sibility of creating market distortions or failures is evident and the introduction of profit-
able demand response resources in the markets can be considered unlikely. Consequently, 
the retail and wholesale market is also the sector, where Energiavirasto has most influence 
and jurisdiction. The strategy statement of Energiavirasto states the goals as developing 
the energy markets, regulation energy efficiency and the security of supply for energy 
(Energiavirasto 2012). What this means is that the study will not be concentrating on the 
use of flexibility for network balancing purposes or ancillary services such as frequency 
containment reserves, frequency restoration reserves. Interruptible contracts between the 
TSO and industrial consumers are also outside the scope of this study, as they have little 
to do with open energy markets.  
 
The focus on the umbrella of terms falling under the demand flexibility will be specifi-
cally on explicit demand flexibility ergo demand response as defined in Chapter 1.1. The 
focus and goal of the study is in finding the optimal operating policies on the open elec-
tricity markets, and implicit flexibility relates to the retail rate or tariff structures created 
by the suppliers. For this reason they have little significance concerning the market oper-
ations.  
 
As this is a thesis aiming at improving the functionality of the energy markets, the study 
will not address the technical aspects such as smart metering, data transfers or possible 
grid challenges caused by demand response. The lucrativeness or profitability of demand 
response is considered mainly from a macroeconomic perspective, by creating a level 
playing field for all actors in the energy markets incorporating flexibility. 
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As explained in Chapter 1.1, demand response is an important resource, which can be 
beneficial in various different uses for network congestion or various markets.  The focus 
of this thesis is however specifically in the wholesale and retail electricity markets. The 
reason for this scope of studies is that there is a major potential to be unleashed Coinci-
dently, this is also the field of demand response, in which there are unresolved issues to 
be solved before implementing the demand response systems on a larger scale. These 
issues consist mostly of the design of the market structure, the resulting balancing errors 
and questions about proper compensations for this resource. The various uses of demand 
response and the scope of the study are presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Schematic presentation of the different uses of flexibility highlighting the focus 
of this study. 
 
The fact that there is a relatively advanced liberalized market for electricity in the Nordics 
and large coverage of smart metering increases the importance of studying demand re-
sponse. Even though these factors should provide an applicable basis for multiple types 
of demand response services, there has been a lack of such programs.  
 
1.5 Aim of the Study 
While the Nordic energy markets are liberalized and can be considered advanced, it seems 
that regulating the market rules in order to achieve highest societal welfare is necessary 
in the energy markets (Adib and Hurlbut 2008). Observing various energy market reforms 
has also revealed that redesigning a market should be conducted as a planned transition 
towards a model incorporating the current basic ingredients of a functional market. Most 
of the unwanted and unexpected outcomes in energy market reforms have been the result 
of misguided design or fumbling implementation. (Sioshansi 2008) 
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The purpose of this study is to form a comprehensive view of implementing demand re-
sponse from the perspective of the national energy regulator. The aim is at clarifying the 
possibilities to encourage the adoption of demand response in the Nordic energy markets, 
and the requisite depth of regulatory oversight.  
 
The following research question is formulated in order to respond to the objectives of this 
study: “What kind of a regulatory framework should we implement in the Nordic elec-
tricity markets to deploy unbiased demand response resources in the markets”. This ob-
jective has been divided into three subquestions to clarify the aims more precisely. By 
answering to these questions, it is possible to form a regulatory model, which is then used 
as a basis for creating the foundation for demand response as a part of the revised energy 
market model. 
 
The research subquestions are stated as follows: 
 
1. What is the value of demand response and how can we ensure that we are gaining 
the full potential of this resource? 
There is a question regarding the value demand response can provide to the mar-
kets and the net benefits of implementing this new scheme. There are also some 
implications of a risk of demand response possibly having a negative net effect in 
some situations. It is thus important to examine how this utility should be handled 
in order to obtain the full potential without the drawbacks. 
 
2. What kind of market model should we adopt for demand response? 
There are multiple different methods for offering demand response in the markets, 
which often are also market specific. The current legislation does allow certain 
types of demand response, but would there be need for expanding the options? 
There are also major questions regarding balancing, unjust expenses and the role 
of a separate third party demand response aggregator, which need to be resolved 
before applying any changes. The available and potential market configurations 
are examined and each of these is analyzed to discover the optimal variation to be 
adopted in the Nordic markets. The aim is at forming a market model, which en-
ables economical demand response on a level playing field without causing neg-
ative effects to third parties or other market distortions. 
 
3. How can we verify that a demand response event took place?  
Demand response is defined as the difference between the level of reduced con-
sumption and the normal level of consumption, which never occurred. The com-
pensations for demand response should be based on verified events, which is why 
there is a need for having a common reliable method to measure the flexibility. 
The study takes a look at the different options available and gives a suggestion to 
be adopted in the Nordic markets. 
 
4. How could the Nordic regulatory authorities contribute to the adoption of this 
new resource?  
As the national regulatory authority, Energiavirasto has a great potential for en-
couraging the adoption of demand response. Based on the previous subquestions 
and relevant findings, set of recommendations is presented for the regulators re-
garding optimal handling of the situation. 
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Based on the research subquestions it is evident that the aspirations of this thesis are am-
ple and challenging. It is however recognized that each of these questions is closely linked 
to each other and that resolving these issues was found to be essential in order to produce 
the results, while focusing only on a subset of these might lead to an excessively vague 
outcome. This thesis aims at providing a comprehensive outlook on how demand re-
sponse should be treated in the Nordic electricity markets and offering a direction for 
further studies regarding the large-scale adoption of the utility.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis begins with an introductory chapter concerning the exact definition of demand 
response and the research topic. In the first chapter the study determines the research 
question and clarifies, why this study is significant based on the background and expected 
future changes in the electricity markets. Further, the introduction addresses the objective 
of the study, incorporating the methodology. Also the scope of the study is defined. The 
introduction is followed by a study on the theoretical framework consisting of an over-
view of market economics relevant to demand response, and mapping of the existing mar-
ket models and regulatory structures based on literature. A synthesis is formed based on 
the theoretical framework, which is then used to draw conclusions regarding the research 
questions. 
 
The second chapter concerns the theoretical framework. First the essential theories of 
market economics regarding demand flexibility and electricity markets such as supply, 
demand, price formation and price elasticity of demand are reviewed. The section ex-
plains the market functions in order to understand how the market forces interact. The 
framework is then elaborated by taking a look at the Nordic electricity markets. The study 
examines the different actors in the markets, and their individual partially conflicting in-
terests and aims concerning the scope of this study. 
 
The third chapter presents an analysis based on the framework introduced in chapter two. 
A general view of the different regulatory and market models in use at the moment is 
presented, after which, the study builds on the given energy market preconditions and 
formulates a justified view answering to the research questions. The study first addresses 
the issues of measuring the amount of flexibility and the net benefits of demand response. 
This is followed by examining the various market models and their suitability. Each 
model is analyzed individually to discover the optimal market configuration regarding 
demand response in the Nordic markets. After this, the study examines the most accurate 
methods for measurement and verification of demand response to be adopted. The third 
chapter concludes by estimating the suitability of the selected models, as well as examin-
ing the required modifications to apply these solutions as well as some related questions. 
Special attention is also given to possible market failures or distortions. 
 
The fourth and final chapter consists of the conclusions of the thesis, which aim at sum-
marizing the entire research. The study presents the findings and recommendations for 
the regulatory authorities regarding the deployment of demand response in the Nordic 
electricity markets. Possible themes for further research are also identified and discussed. 
The relevance of the study is assessed both as a scientific study as well as a guideline for 
the regulators in responding to the changing environment. The chapter concludes by list-
ing individual recommendations for actions for the Nordic regulators.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Demand Flexibility and Market Economics 
Reviewing the basic fundamentals of market economics is required in order to understand 
how liberalized electricity markets function and how the individual actions taken by mar-
ket players affect the market. The formation of demand and supply curves and how they 
bring the market participants together is presented. This basic theory is then elaborated to 
cover the specifics of electricity trading on a liberalized market. In order to understand 
the challenges of implementing new demand response regulation, the study introduces 
the various different parties operating on the markets, as well as their interests and ambi-
tions. As discussed in Chapter 3.3.1, new regulatory principles should aim at creating a 
level playing field for all the market participants. In order to do this, this chapter is con-
cluded by taking a look at the possible conflicts between the market players. 
 
2.1.1 Demand, Supply and Price Formation 
The demand curve is a graphic interpretation of how much consumers are willing to pay 
for a commodity. The presumption is that any consumer has a possibility to choose over 
which products to consume, and that the consumers are facing scarcity. This means that 
they have limited resources, which forces consumers to make choices regarding how 
much resources one is willing to use for each individual commodity. These choices reflect 
the consumer’s own needs, and the perceived value of various commodities. It is assumed 
that each consumer is pursuing the maximal utility within the budget constraints set by 
the resources. The fundamental theorem of demand applies this assumption to the price 
and demand of a product, stating that the rate of consumption falls, as the price of the 
product increases. A similar simplified reasoning can be presented also based on the 
amount of products consumed. The first commodity, such as a pair of shoes is valuable 
to a person walking barefoot, but the subjective benefit of acquiring a second pair is lower. 
This is called diminishing marginal utility, and is the reason for the shape of the demand 
curve. The demand curve for a single consumer might be a straight line, and it is often 
more useful to form a curve representing the demand as a whole. This can be done by 
adding up the all the individual customers. An example of forming a demand curve from 
individual linear demand curves is presented in Figure 5. The individual demand curves 
of single consumers are denoted as D1, D2 and D3, and the total demand curve as D123. 
The market demand curve is the total sum of all individual demand curves. This results 
in a downward sloping curve presented in Figure 6. Price is measured on the vertical axis 
and the amount on the horizontal axis. (Parkin 2014) 
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Figure 5. Combining the individual consumers’ linear demand curves 
 
Figure 6. The demand curve 
 
The demand curve expresses the relation between price and the amount of this commodity 
the consumers are willing and capable of purchasing at this price. This can be done for 
instance by selecting any point on the curve and reading the corresponding price value 
horizontally on the y-axis and the amount of consumption by reading the value vertically 
on the x-axis. It is used to estimate and portray the consumers’ behavior in competitive 
markets. (Parkin 2014) 
 
The supply curve is analogous to the demand curve. It is a visualization of the relationship 
between price and the quantity of this commodity that a seller is willing and able to sup-
ply. The interpretation of this curve is similar to supply curve. The reason, why the supply 
curve is sloping upwards is a result of the companies’ aim at maximizing their profits. 
Any profits made by the company are a result of sales margin, which is the difference 
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between the income and the expenses. This income is a result of selling the products. It 
is assumed that under perfect competition supply is determined by the marginal cost of 
the commodity in question. Marginal cost is the change in total cost when the output of a 
company is increased by one single unit. It is best described as the varying tangent of the 
marginal cost curve, which is presented in Figure 7. According to this, any company will 
increase the output until the cost of producing additional units is more expensive than the 
price they would receive for selling this product. The supply curve is based on the mar-
ginal cost curve. If the supplier were to exceed the optimal marginal costs, the losses 
would have to be compensated in a higher price. This results in a curve sloping upwards. 
(Parkin 2014) 
 
Figure 7. The Marginal cost curve 
 
In order to understand how the markets work and how market players interact, we com-
bine the two curves in one single diagram. The fundamental assumption is that each con-
sumer and supplier accept the prices given by the market, and that each individual player 
has little power to affect the market price in these open markets of perfect competition. 
Each market player is pursuing their own optimal price and there is a tendency for the 
price to vary until the market reaches a balance. This is called the market mechanism, and 
it results in the quantity supplied and demanded being equal. Market balance is visualized 
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as the crossing point of the demand and supply curves. (Parkin 2014) This is presented in 
Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Market balance 
 
While introducing the theory regarding the basics of market economics, some assump-
tions were made in order to introduce the theories. Regarding the validity this study, it 
has to be ensured that the theory applies in the specific market in question, such as the 
Nordic electricity markets in this study. While outlining the demand and supply curves, 
it was assumed that any given quantity would be produced and sold, regardless of the 
price. This makes sense only, if there is at least a roughly competitive market for the 
commodity in question. In practice this means that the sellers and buyers have little mar-
ket power over the prices. Should the markets be controlled by a single monopolistic 
supplier, the relation between price and quantity would not apply any more. The monop-
olist producer would be able to affect the prices, for instance forcing the price to be fixed, 
while changing the quantity supplied. It should be understood that the model of supply 
and demand is applicable only, when one is applying it to a competitive market consisting 
of numerous suppliers and consumers. (Parkin 2014) Hence, in the case of Nordic elec-
tricity markets the introduced market theory can be considered valid, as there are numer-
ous parties on both demand and supply side. A detailed review of the Nordic electricity 
markets can be found in chapters 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. 
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2.1.2 The Effect Demand Response has over Market Equilibrium, and 
Price Elasticity of Demand 
To understand the mechanisms how demand response can decrease both the demand of 
electricity as well as the cost of electricity, one has to understand how different changes 
in the supply and demand affect the market equilibrium. The study will first review these 
changes in general from the perspective of market economics, after which this is applied 
for demand response in the electricity markets. (Parkin 2014) 
 
The supply and demand curves should not be considered static, but instead as a varying 
projection of the current market situation. Figure 9 presents, how the quantity of demand 
for a certain commodity changes as a result of an increase in the consumers’ incomes. 
Should the commodity prices remain static, we would see an increase in the quantity of 
demand, represented as the change from Q1 to Q2. On the other hand, we can also interpret 
the situation asking how much a single consumer would be willing to pay for a given 
quantity of the commodity, which is represented as the change from P1 to P2. Regardless 
of the viewpoint, the demand curve as a whole will shift to the right. A shift in the position 
of the demand curve can occur also based on other things than an increase in the income. 
A change in the perceived value of a product affects how much the consumers are willing 
to pay for the commodity in question, again shifting the demand curve. (Parkin 2014) 
 
Similar movements can be observed also in the supply curve. If the supply of the com-
modity is increasing, the supply curve shifts to the right, which is presented in Figure 10. 
Correspondingly, decreasing supply shifts the supply curve to the left. The reasons for a 
change in the quantity supplied can be a result of various variables in addition to price. 
Production cost, wages and cost of raw materials all have a significant effect on the quan-
tity supplied. As an example of this, lowered raw material costs increase the output shift-
ing the supply curve to the right, provided that the price remains the same. (Parkin 2014) 
 
 
Figure 9. The transition of the demand curve and the effect on market balance 
 
As demonstrated above, the demand and supply curves are constantly moving as a re-
sponse in changes in the environment or other factors, and the market mechanism results 
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in an equilibrium in the intersection of the two curves. It is hence evident that the shifting 
curves change the location of the market balance, also known as the market clearing point. 
This means that the equilibrium prices and quantities also vary depending on the current 
market situation. A shift in the supply curve is introduced in Figure 9. Let´s consider a 
similar shift for example as a result of lowering production costs and examine its effect 
in the market balance. Figure 10 presents a situation, where the supply curve has shifted 
from S to S´ similarly as in Figure 9. As a result, the market price decreases from P1 to 
P2. At the same time the total quantity produced increases from Q1 to Q3. This is consistent 
with the intuitive assumption. Lower production costs result in lower prices and increased 
sales. Analogously, an increase in the production costs would cause an opposite result; 
the supply curve would shift to the left, prices market prices would increase and the total 
quantity would decrease. (Parkin 2014) 
Figure 10. The transition of supply curve and the effect on market balance 
 
In most markets however, both demand and supply curves are shifting repeatedly. The 
economic situation and fluctuating needs depending on the time of the year affect the 
demand of a certain commodity. The resulting market equilibrium depends on the shape 
and how much the curve is shifting. Figure 11 presents how the new market balance is 
formed as a result of both demand and supply curves shifting. The resulting quantity of 
demand for the commodity or the price can be hard to predict, unless the dependence of 
supply and demand on price and other variables ergo the shape of the curves are well 
known. In the case of electricity markets, the shape of the supply curve is largely based 
on the existing power production facilities and therefore well known. (Parkin 2014) 
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Figure 11. The new market balance as a result of the movement of both demand and 
supply curves. 
 
In addition to the introduced concepts, there are some essential definitions to be under-
stood regarding demand response and market economics such as substitutes, complemen-
tary goods and elasticities. Substitutes are two commodities for which an increase in the 
price leads to an increase in the quantity of the other. (Parkin 2014) For example other 
means of flexibility such as oil fired backup power stations could be considered as a sub-
stitute for demand response. Analogously, commodities are complementary, when an in-
crease in price of one results in decrease in the quantity demanded of the other. Elasticities 
of supply and demand in turn represent the change in a variable resulting from an increase 
in another. It is often used to describe how much the quantity demanded will change 
according to a 1-percent change in the price level. This is called price elasticity of de-
mand. (Parkin 2014) Denoting quantity as Q and price as P, it can be written as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑝 =
%∆𝑄
%∆P
  
 
Equation 1. Price elasticity of demand 
 
The price elasticity of demand results usually in a negative number, because the quantity 
demanded usually falls as the price increases. It is however common to only present the 
magnitude of change using only the absolute value of the flexibility instead of the nega-
tive value.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.2, the demand of electricity has traditionally been considered 
inelastic. Inelastic demand means that the demand of electricity is permanently at a fixed 
quantity, which can be illustrated as a straight vertical line as the demand curve. 
(International Energy Agency 2011) It would seem evident that the demand does not re-
main constant as the prices vary from time to time. It is however impossible for an end 
user to adjust the electricity used – ergo to form an actual demand curve – if the price 
signals do not reach the actual users of electricity, or if there is no market mechanism to 
produce value for these actions. 
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Should demand response be introduced into the markets, the quantity of demand would 
alternate depending on the price, as the individual end users optimize their electricity 
usage according to the current situation. This is illustrated as the sloped demand curve in 
Figure 2. (International Energy Agency 2011) As can be observed, demand response re-
sults in lower pricing and reduced power output. (International Energy Agency 2011) The 
following chapter explains in detail the functions of price formation in the Nordic elec-
tricity markets and how to apply demand response according to the theories introduced 
in this chapter. 
 
2.1.3 The Nordic Electricity Markets  
According to Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996), there are four different basic electricity sup-
ply models, for which the evolution towards fully competed markets can be divided. The 
first model is a traditional monopoly, in which there is one utility, which is responsible 
for the generation, transfer and distribution of electricity, or alternatively one generation 
and transmission utility, which sells all the electricity to a local monopoly distribution 
company. In the second market development stage, an independent power producer is 
introduced to the markets. This producer is connected to the network and allowed to sell 
the electricity to the utility acting as a purchasing agent. This purchasing agency model 
can evolve further to a stage, where the generation capacity consists only of independent 
power producers. At this stage there is some competition between the power producers, 
but the rates of electricity have to be regulated because of the monopoly situation of the 
purchaser. The third developmental stage of the electricity markets is wholesale compe-
tition, in which there is no central party responsible for provision of electricity. Each of 
the distribution companies purchase electricity according to the total demand of their 
companies from the generating companies from a wholesale electricity market. At the 
retail level there is however still a centralized operator, because each of the distribution 
companies is responsible for operating the regional distribution network and purchasing 
the electricity on behalf of their own customers. Compared to the previous model, whole-
sale competition induces a lot more competition between the generating companies, as 
the price is determined on the markets according to demand and supply. The price for the 
end customers however has to be regulated, because there is no freedom of selecting the 
supplier. The fourth and ultimate form of competitive electricity markets is called retail 
competition, in which every customer has a possibility to select their own supplier of 
electricity. The retail prices no longer have to be regulated, because the customers have a 
possibility to change their own retailer. The only remaining monopolies are operating the 
transmission, and possibly the distribution network. The expenses of the network are cov-
ered by payments by all the network users. These charges have to be regulated, as the 
networks still remain monopolies.  (Hunt and Shuttleworth 1996) 
 
Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden started to liberalize their energy markets in the 
1990’s opening them to a stage of retail competition forming what is now called the Nor-
dic energy market (Hunt and Shuttleworth 1996). At first, these countries only opened 
their own national markets. This however soon led to forming an open electricity market 
to cover the whole Nordic area, as the potential benefits of doing so became evident. 
(NordREG 2009) The changes in the electricity markets were made to introduce compe-
tition in electricity generation and selling, while the transmission and distribution net-
works were to remain natural monopolies, as they still are. One of the most important 
goals of deregulating was to promote the efficiency of the electricity supply industry. The 
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traditional vertically integrated monopoly of generation, selling, transmission and distri-
bution had led to a situation, where significant cost savings could be achieved by intro-
ducing competition in the markets. (Viljainen 2005) (Tahvanainen 2010) 
 
Energy market liberalization is defined in the European Commission’s third energy pack-
age directive as the freedom of selecting the supplier of electricity and vice-versa the 
freedom of all suppliers to deliver electricity to their customers. The directive advocates 
ownership unbundling, which means separating the electricity production from transmis-
sion operators. The aim in this is to avoid the inherent conflicting interests and to ensure 
security of supply. (European Commission 2009) This directive is enforced in each of the 
Nordic countries’ own legislation in a similar fashion. For example in Finland the Elec-
tricity Market Act states that any company operating in the electricity markets has to 
separate the grid operations from other electricity trade, and the electricity business units 
from other business activity conducted by the company (The Finnish Government 2013). 
The electricity markets in all the Nordic countries are organized so that the grid compa-
nies have a status as a local monopoly, which is hence subject to regulation. Regardless 
of this, each customer can select their own supplier of electricity. (NordREG 2009) 
(Tahvanainen 2010) (Viljainen 2005) 
 
The trade of electricity in the Nordic countries is conducted on Nord Pool Spot AS (NPS), 
which is a power market owned mainly by the Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Danish 
transmission system operators and the Baltic countries by a smaller share. NPS is licenced 
by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, and as a company registered 
in Norway it operates under Norwegian law. (NordPoolSpot 2015a)  
 
The most central trading area in NPS is the day-ahead market, Elspot. It operates every 
single day and there are over 350 buyers and sellers, of which most trade on a daily basis. 
On the Elspot market, each of the market participants is estimating its operations for the 
following day. The producers of electricity try to estimate how much they can deliver at 
each hour of the following day. They also set their price level for this amount of electric-
ity. Correspondingly, the purchasers of electricity make an estimate of the electricity re-
quired during each hour and set the price they are willing to pay for it.  All the bids and 
orders are entered into the Elspot trading system, and none of the active market players 
is aware of bids made by others. After the daily closing hour of 12:00 CET, which is the 
deadline for submitting bids for the following day, all the purchase bids and production 
bids are merged into the demand curve and supply curve correspondingly as explained in 
Chapter 2.1.1. An algorithm is used to calculate the market equilibrium consisting of the 
system price and volume, which is then published for each hour of the following day. 
This is presented in Figure 12. The main function of the markets is to pool all the bids on 
the markets in order to produce electricity at the lowest possible price. There are multiple 
bidding areas in the Nordic markets, and to relieve congestion, some area prices are set 
higher to reduce demand in these areas affected by insufficient transmission capacity. 
After the hourly system prices are set by the algorithm, the actual area prices are deter-
mined according to the transmission capacity available for the area in question. 
(NordPoolSpot 2015a) 
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Figure 12. Price formation in the Elspot markets (NordPoolSpot 2015a) 
 
In addition to the Elspot day-ahead markets, NPS operates an intraday market, Elbas. As 
the majority of the trading volume is conducted on the Elspot market, the role of Elbas is 
in ensuring that the balance between production and demand of electricity matches at a 
shorter time interval. As the day-ahead trade is cleared 12 hours or longer before the 
actual delivery hour, it is not uncommon for an incident to occur affecting the production 
capacity. A fault in a large production facility or a change in the wind conditions may 
cause lower power generation than anticipated. Elbas is traded close to real time, every 
day until one hour before the delivery, so it makes it possible for the buyers and sellers to 
bring the market back to balance. Contrary to the day-ahead markets, trading at Elbas is 
based on a first-come first-serve principle. This means that the highest buy price and the 
lowest sell price comes first. (NordPoolSpot 2015a)  
 
In addition to the introduced two markets maintained by Nord Pool Spot, there is an ad-
ditional balancing market. Let´s first take a look at balancing as a concept. The Finnish 
TSO Fingrid defines balancing as maintaining the continuous power balance between 
electricity production and consumption (Fingrid 2015). This constant balancing has to be 
done in order to maintain network stability at all times. Regardless of the day-ahead and 
intraday markets’ tendency to discover the amount of demand at each moment, there are 
always unexpected circumstances such as changes in consumption, weather or grid con-
ditions, which make it normal to have some imbalances occurring in the system. 
(NordREG 2010)  
 
In order to maintain balance, the national TSO in the Nordic countries has balancing 
agreements with different Balance Responsible Parties (BRP). Each of the BRPs has to 
make a plan regarding their electricity consumption and supply them to the TSO. This 
plan acts as a baseline for the consumption, and the BRP is financially responsible for 
any deviation from this plan. This acts as a strong incentive for precise planning and 
forecasting of the electricity usage as exactly as possible until the TSOs gate closure time 
an hour before the actual operating hour. It is mandatory for all the consumption, produc-
tion and grid connection points to have a BRP, and each trader, producer or supplier has 
to either act as a BRP themselves or have a standing contract with one to handle the 
balancing. In the case of large end users of electricity with the required know-how and 
resources, it is also possible for a consumer to act also as a BRP. There is some difference 
between the Nordic countries’ regulation regarding balancing, but the procedures are in 
the end very similar. (NordREG 2010) 
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The Nordic electricity markets have become highly united and the wholesale markets are 
truly uniting the different national grids. The whole area is characterized by cross-border 
balancing, where the adjustments will be made with the least expensive method just as 
long as there is transmission capacity available. It can be said that the Nordic electricity 
markets form one unified balancing area. Consequently, there is an ongoing process 
among the Nordic countries to unify the balancing methods called Nordic Balance Settle-
ment (NBS) (NordREG 2009). Regarding demand response, the most likely market to 
require special attention is the balancing market. The European Commission’s Expert 
Group on smart grids has recognized some potential problems regarding the effects de-
mand response might have on the Balance Responsible Party. (Smart Grid Task Force 
2015) Elaboration on the balancing issues related to introducing demand response can be 
found in Chapter 3.3.2.  
 
2.1.4 Independent Parties on the Demand Response Markets 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.5, the aim is at creating a regulative model, which enables a 
level playing field for the different market players regarding demand response. There are 
numerous individual actors in these markets, each of which having their own, possibly 
conflicting interests. In order to understand how and why do these actors interact in the 
electricity and demand response markets, one has to take a closer look at these market 
players. The relevant market players are assessed individually, disclosing the main moti-
vators and risks they have regarding demand response. 
 
Electricity retailers purchase electrical energy from the producers at a price level deter-
mined by the market forces. A margin is added to the purchasing price, after which this 
electricity is sold to a large number of consumers. Just as any retailer, they try to estimate 
the amount of electricity to purchase by evaluating the demand among their consumers. 
Based on this demand forecast, the retailer develops a purchasing strategy in order to 
maximize profits. (Kirschen and Strbac 2008) This approximation of demand is con-
ducted for each hour separately, just as the purchasing bids. As discussed in Chapter 2.1.3, 
any deviation from the planned consumption of electricity results in imbalances in the 
balance settlement, and hence in additional costs for the retailer. This system provides an 
incentive for the consumer to maintain the balance as precisely as possible. Caves and 
Eakin (2000) argue that the demand estimates made by retailers are unfit for predicting 
demand spikes, which can lead to major financial problems among the retailers. The adop-
tion of demand response would thus provide a tool for the retailer to mitigate risks.  
 
The TSO has the operative responsibility of the network, maintaining the security of the 
transmission system. In this case security means assessing whether the network can with-
stand unexpected faults. The TSO prepares for these contingencies by various means. 
(Nguyen, Negnevitsky and de Groot 2011) Hiskens and Gong (2006) propose the use of 
demand response as a tool for load curtailment, while the Smart Grid Task Force (2015) 
recognize frequency control, congestion management and avoiding grid losses as the po-
tential advantages of demand response for the TSO. While adopting demand response 
might solve some problems regarding the TSOs challenges, adopting demand response 
merely as a tool for the TSO, without including it in the electricity trading, would prevent 
it from having an effect on the electricity markets’ efficiency. In other words, the system 
security would enhance, but the price or demand spikes would not be avoided. 
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Distributors, or distribution system operators (DSOs) are responsible for maintaining the 
distribution network, which is connected to the transmission network through various 
substations. Similarly to the TSO, DSOs can benefit from demand response using it for 
demand curtailment to avoid congestion in their network. (Nguyen, Negnevitsky and de 
Groot 2011) Applying demand response can also help the DSO by reducing the network 
investments, as demonstrated by Strbac (2008). In the Nordic countries the DSOs are 
obliged to act as a neutral market facilitator (NordREG 2009). This means that they have 
to deliver the same service to all stakeholders without discrimination.  
 
Small consumers, such as for example a household, purchase electricity from the retailer. 
The electricity is distributed to the consumers using a connection from the local distribu-
tion company. Traditionally, the role of the small customer has been very low and limited 
to merely selecting the supplier of electricity among the available options. (Kirschen and 
Strbac 2008) On the other hand, harnessing large amounts of households for demand re-
sponse would provide major advantages in peak shaving as estimated by Hans Gils (2014) 
in his assessment of the demand response potential in Europe. From the small consumers’ 
perspective demand response might not be considered very lucrative, compared to the 
current low retail prices of electricity (NordPoolSpot 2015b). The payoff for any task or 
action conducted by the small consumer themselves would most probably be considered 
redundant. On the other hand, any financial gains would most probably be considered 
beneficial if the response of the small consumers was conducted by a third party or the 
retailer, and the effect of this response to the consumer themselves was minimal.  
 
Large consumers differ from the small consumers in more ways than merely in the de-
mand of electricity. As a contrast, they often have a more active role in the electricity 
markets, purchasing their electricity directly from the wholesale markets in order to avoid 
excessive costs created by the retailer as an irrelevant intermediary. The large consumers 
are also an appealing facet for demand response, because of the large amount of electricity 
demanded by these major end-users. Some of these actors have an agreement with the 
ISO to control and direct their loads in order to control the transmission system. (Kirschen 
and Strbac 2008) This flexibility does not however fall under the umbrella of demand 
response, as it is used mainly as a system resource to handle unexpected situations in 
instead of truly incorporating the flexibility in the markets.  
 
Each electricity market participant and network operator has to have one open supplier, 
which has the responsibility for the electricity balancing over the market player in ques-
tion. The market players form a chain of open deliveries, where the last open supplier is 
the TSO, and the second to last is the balance responsible party (BRP). The Finnish trans-
mission system operator Fingrid (2015) defines the BRP as an electricity market party, 
which has a valid balance service agreement with the TSO. BRP, as well as other open 
suppliers have balance responsibility for the power production and purchases to match 
the consumption and sales of electricity for each hour as described in Chapter 2.1.3. 
(Fingrid 2015) The European Commission’s Smart Grid Task Force (2015) recognizes 
BRPs as the key users of flexibility, because demand response enables accurate adjusting 
the electricity balance on a shorter timescale. Currently the majority of flexibility is 
achieved using flexibility contracts with power plants such as gas-fired plants or hydro 
plants. In addition, the increase in uncontrollable photovoltaic and wind power production 
accent the need for the BRP to meet the balancing requirements. (Smart Grid Task Force 
2015) 
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Aggregators are new actors operating in the electricity markets. They operate as brokers 
between the end users of electricity and the service operators such as the retailer, or alter-
natively they act as an independent actor sourcing and offering flexibility to the markets. 
Aggregating offers the opportunity to maximize the potential of flexibility of the grid 
users. It is a commercial function of pooling de-centralized generation or consumption to 
provide services within the grid system (Smart Grid Task Force 2015). The aggregators 
have control over the electricity users’ consumption and thus are capable of performing 
demand response. The mode of operation according to Energy Pool (2015), a current Eu-
ropean demand response aggregator in operation, is paying a fixed rate per available MWs 
of capacity made available and a variable rate for each MWh of consumption that has 
been shifted  by switching off energy-intensive appliances such as heating or air-condi-
tioning for a short period of time. The aggregator represents a large amount of demand, 
which makes it more efficient to negotiate efficiently on behalf of the end users. Currently 
the role of the aggregators in the Nordic electricity markets is low, but the significance of 
having aggregators is however recognized to be very important concerning demand re-
sponse. The role of the aggregators in the markets is analyzed further in Chapter 3.1.2. 
 
2.1.5 Conflicting Interests among Individual Parties and the Net Ben-
efits of Demand Response 
As introduced in the previous chapter, there is a wide range of different parties operating 
in the electricity markets. These parties have varying roles ranging from nationwide re-
sponsibilities such as the operation of the transmission network to single operators merely 
pursuing financial benefit. It should be understood that these aspirations guide the actions 
of each market participant, and the action might have influence on the others. It is hence 
the regulators’ and legislative authorities’ responsibility to ensure fair and functional mar-
ket conduct rules before initiating the demand response schemes on a larger scale. 
 
Depending on the market model adopted for demand response, we might face a situation, 
where we have an aggregation service provider, which has to be able to operate separately 
from the supplier of the consumers’ supplier or BRP. There might be need for information 
flows between the actors, even though at the same time, these parties might be competi-
tors for each other. (SEDC 2015a) (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) What this means is that 
we might be facing a situation, in which we have to design some kind of cooperation or 
data exchange methods between competitors in order to reach competition between the 
parties and hence achieve an optimal outcome. In addition, if we are to enable independ-
ent third party aggregation, each reduced megawatt-hour will decrease the supplier’s rev-
enue correspondingly. A more thorough analysis of the market model challenges can be 
found in Chapter 3.1.2 
 
It should also be understood that each of the independent parties on the demand response 
markets aim only at optimizing the situation for their part. For instance, a retailer aiming 
at maximizing its profit through flexibility activities might have an adverse impact on the 
TSO or the distribution network. For this reason, any partial optimization conducted only 
one of the market participants in mind is likely to create sub-optimal solutions technically, 
financially and socially. (Nguyen, Negnevitsky and de Groot 2011)  
 
From the economic perspective, any partial approach is inefficient, and calculating the 
social benefits of demand response can be expected to be difficult. The social net benefit 
can however be expected to be more important than the individual benefits due to its 
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nature of indicating the usefulness of demand response for all of the stakeholders. In ad-
dition, assessing the net benefits removes the risk of conducting flexibility activities, 
which have negative net effects, which otherwise might occur. (Nguyen, Negnevitsky and 
de Groot 2011) (Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012) From a regulators’ perspective this 
means that the market layout should be designed concerning the net benefits, disregarding 
any considerations concentrating only on one actor. More specific analysis of the net ben-
efits as well as a model for estimating the profitability of a single bid can be found in 
Chapter 3.1.1. 
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3 Research and Analysis 
3.1 Regulatory and Market Models for Demand Response 
Although demand response is a relatively new scheme, there are already some markets, 
where the end-users can bid their demand reduction on an open market. This chapter con-
centrates on assessing the variant modes of operation and the optimal choices for the 
Nordic markets. The chapter addresses the proper level of compensation for demand re-
sponse in light of the market experiences as well as relevant studies regarding the eco-
nomic evaluation and net benefits. Special attention is put on addressing the dispute re-
garding the correct level of compensation due to the external costs inflicted on third par-
ties. The section concludes by offering a method for determining the measurement and 
verification of demand response to be used in the Nordic electricity markets. 
 
3.1.1 Pricing and Valuation of Demand Response  
As reported in the previous chapters, there are multiple functional markets for demand 
response at the moment. Regardless of the experience we have had in this new market 
player during the years of operation, there is still some disagreement regarding the proper 
compensation for reducing demand. There are differing opinions both in the American, 
as well as in European markets on how to valuate demand response and how to divide the 
profits among the market participants. An intrinsic stance might be to simply pay for the 
response according to the current market price, but there are arguments for decreasing 
this monetary compensation for the flexibility. In this chapter the study presents the var-
iant stands and their reasoning.  
 
The American markets have had the role of a pioneer in demand response services. For 
this reason the first regulatory stand regarding the value of demand response was set by 
The Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC), as they introduced Order No. 745, 
Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets. According 
to this, demand response resources should be compensated at the locational marginal price 
(LMP), provided that the LMP was at a sufficiently high level according to a net benefit 
test. It was also decided that the resources participating in demand response must be re-
sources, which are unexposed to the real time price of electricity. (FERC 2011) This rul-
ing has set the nationwide standard for the appropriate valuation of demand response. The 
electricity markets in the USA have a nodal pricing system, where the price at each LMP 
takes into account both the current scarcity of generation as well as the transmission ca-
pacity. Thus compensation based on LMP reflects the value of demand response to the 
system in terms of electricity balancing and transmission congestion management. 
(ACER 2014) What this means, is that according to this statement and disregarding the 
few restrictions to participating in demand response programs, demand response should 
be valued at the same level as electricity. This should in fact be the natural outcome in 
the markets, provided that the market is designed so that it does not have unfavorable 
effects and flexibility resources can participate on a level field compared to other sources 
of electricity. It should not make a difference, whether the additional energy to be pur-
chased comes from increasing production at power plants, or reduction in the consump-
tion just as long as the price can be determined in the markets and the increase in capacity 
verified. 
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Regardless of FERC’s definition of demand response policy, there has been a strenuous 
debate regarding the proper level of compensation for demand response. According to the 
opposing view against paying the full market price for demand response, paying the full 
market price for demand response results in a compensation, which exceeds the value of 
the response. (Hogan, Implications for Consumers of the NOPR's Proposal to Pay the 
LMP for All Demand Response 2010) This opposing argument is based on the idea that 
while a demand response participant is paid the full market price, it is at the same time 
avoiding the payment of the marginal cost of generation in the retail tariffs. As a result, 
the price paid for the reduced consumption likely exceeds the cost of using wholesale 
market generators to produce this energy and we are facing an efficiency loss. As a solu-
tion to this problem, it is suggested that the compensation for demand response should be 
defined by subtracting the retail tariffs from the market price. This subtraction is denoted 
as LMP-G (R. Borlick 2011) In short, this economic debate concerns the long-term ben-
efits and the possible distortions caused by unsuccessful pricing regulations.  
 
Decreasing the price paid for demand response might prove to be problematic at least in 
the Nordic electricity markets concerning the adoption of flexibility. At the moment, the 
electricity prices can are very low, and the consequent loss of profit margin by paying 
even lower than the retail price of electricity would most probably decrease the amount 
of demand response to a minimum (NordPoolSpot 2015a) (Falk and Rosenzweig, 
Critique Betrays Misperception of Purpose of Demand Response 2011). This might also 
be against the idea of accepting demand response as an equal resource on a level playing 
field in the electricity markets as suggested by the European Commission (Smart Grid 
Task Force 2015). Regardless of this, it should be understood that the pricing decision 
should not be based on the expected increase or decrease in demand response services. 
The argumentation should instead be based on economic evaluation and net benefits on 
the long run. It is also arguable, that the relevance of the LMP-G argument is low as long 
as the price is determined on open markets according to current demand conditions as 
described in Chapter 2.1.1. In order to establish an understanding regarding demand re-
sponse and its value in the markets, one should however assess the question more thor-
oughly. 
 
The introduced views on the rationale behind the LMP-G argumentation are however 
challenged, expressing some putative errors. The shortcomings of the logic are disclosed 
by comparing the argument to a situation, where fuel tax is imposed on some generators 
of energy while others don’t have to pay it for instance due to their minor emissions. By 
following the LMP-G logic, we should also decrease the price we pay for the less pollut-
ing producers by the amount of tax paid by the other producers. Otherwise the tax would 
put an efficiency wedge between those who must pay the tax and those who are exempt. 
The LMP-G argumentation is rationalized as leveling the playing field, but in light of this 
the whole concept seems to be somewhat distorted. Even though the price difference can 
be considered as an example of operating cost inefficiency in the electricity markets, there 
is a strong argument for allowing the markets to operate in this fashion. Leveling the 
prices would render useless all the public purposes, for which the tax was set in the first 
place for one reason or another. In addition to this, the market price (in this case locational 
market price, LMP) reflects the current market situation and should be taken as given for 
each of the market participants. The same analogy should be true also in the case of de-
mand response. (Falk and Rosenzweig, Critique Betrays Misperception of Purpose of 
Demand Response 2011) (Falk, We Agree on Everything, Except Compencation at LMP 
2011) This means that the market price is considered as the correct level of compensation 
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for the specific amount of electrical capacity. A level playing field refers to allowing 
access for new participants to bid and compete against each other. It does not mean that 
we should compensate every electricity production method according to the level of their 
production expenses. In light of the argumentation above, the ideas about leveling the 
costs as a result of market price seem to be somewhat misshapen. 
 
Even though the opinion of paying less than the market price for demand response re-
sources seems biased, there might be some veritability to the LMP-G arguments. There 
are some questions regarding considering demand response equally compared to genera-
tion, and some arguments have stated that regardless of similar features they are not the 
same physically or economically. This intuitively simple transaction proves to be a bit 
more complicated, as explained in the comments for FERC demand response proposals 
(Hogan, Providing Incentives for Efficient Demand Response 2009). To understand this 
view, one must see, how the whole reason for having specific demand response programs 
is actually a result of retail rate structures intervening with the market. The resulting de-
mand curve is considered inadequate in depicting demand conditions. Due to the market 
model, there is also lack of interest in reducing consumption when the prices are high, 
because of the retail tariff. This could be avoided by having real-time pricing for all cus-
tomers, much like the wholesale markets. The solution regarding demand response should 
not be paying market price for demand response. Instead, the solution should be to charge 
a hourly market price for the actual consumption and have no other demand response at 
all (Hogan, Demand Response Compensation, Net Benefits and Cost Allocation: 
Preliminary Comments 2010). This however is not the case, at least for now, in the retail 
electricity markets, and the appropriate demand response compensation remains a ques-
tion. It would seem that we are facing a situation, where we are applying complex struc-
tures to compensate for an error in the markets since there is no will to correct the actual 
market error. This is naturally bound to make it increasingly difficult to estimate the net 
benefits. 
 
In the case of dynamic pricing, the consumers pay according to real-time or day-ahead 
pricing for the usage of electricity. Faced with this kind of pricing, any customer is able 
to make a contract for a fixed price to purchase a given quantity of electricity. After this, 
it is evident that the customer now owns the energy, and is free to consume it or sell it 
back to the retailer or a third party. According to Hogan, should this customer sell this 
electricity back, the appropriate price paid for it would be the market clearing price during 
that time. By remembering that the customer had already paid the fixed price, so the net 
transaction for the customer would be market price minus the fixed price, ergo the value 
of demand response should be less than the market price. Hogan continues by explaining 
how this transaction would likely be described simply as resale of power, but from the 
system operator’s perspective the power flow in these transactions is indistinguishable 
from demand response. By applying the symmetry principle, the payment for the trans-
action through purchase and sale should be the same as in demand response. (Hogan, 
Providing Incentives for Efficient Demand Response 2009) (Hogan, Demand Response 
Compensation, Net Benefits and Cost Allocation: Preliminary Comments 2010) This is a 
strong argument favoring the LMP-G logic. The argumentation proceeds by stating, that 
while many statements regarding demand response take for granted that reducing elec-
tricity prices is beneficial and a cost-effective ambition, this assumption might be wrong. 
The expected reduction in electricity prices as a result of consumer flexibility by paying 
the full market price can be considered as a transfer payment from generators to custom-
ers. It is of course considered beneficial for the customers, but from the perspective of 
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generators it is a cost, and the total sum effect at least according to Hogan remains non-
existent meaning that there is no net benefit at all. He argues, that the benefits of demand 
response amount to no less than “an application of regulatory authority to enforce a 
buyer’s cartel”, and paying full market price for the flexibility would be an unfair com-
pensation and therefore should be also considered as market manipulation (Hogan, 
Implications for Consumers of the NOPR's Proposal to Pay the LMP for All Demand 
Response 2010).  (Hogan, Providing Incentives for Efficient Demand Response 2009) 
The proponents of paying the full market price however bring up the important notion 
that the whole reason for having such a debate was originally raised in the context that 
the markets were not attracting a sufficient level of demand response under the previous 
pricing scheme, which valuated demand response below the market price. In addition, it 
is noted that the LMP-G proponents seem to disregard the high cost of adding capacity 
and the cost of outages in their argumentation. (Falk and Rosenzweig, Critique Betrays 
Misperception of Purpose of Demand Response 2011) 
 
This debate is closely linked to the dispute about whether the flexibility provider should 
even be allowed to sell its flexibility and at which price? The fundamental issue centers 
on the difference between reselling something you have purchased and selling something 
you would have purchased, without actually purchasing it as often argumented in the case 
of demand response. The FERC order No. 745, introducing demand response compensa-
tion and implementation in the USA includes a comment stating that demand response 
should be treated in all essentials equivalent to supply response, and that it should be 
rewarded with the same market clearing price as any other kind of response (FERC 2011). 
A similar definition can also be found in the European Commission’s EG3 report stating: 
“The value of a MW should be decided regardless of who or what is providing that MW” 
(Smart Grid Task Force 2015). It should be understood that what is being sold in demand 
response is not the power someone else has bought, but instead the ability to consume as 
much power as one likes at the retail rate. This can be demonstrated by an analogy with 
the stock markets. If one holds an option to buy one share for $100, when the current 
price for this share is $130, $30 is an underestimate of the value. Further, as the volatility 
rises, so does the value of this option until it is $130 irrespective of other factors. The 
value of this option depends on multiple factors: time value of money, time until expira-
tion of this option and the volatility - and so also should the price of an opportunity to 
consume electricity. This aspect is however overlooked in the arguments favoring LMP-
G pricing. In addition to this logic, it is also possible that the LMP actually is an under-
estimate of the value of possible lost load during outages. (Falk, Paying for Demand-Side 
response at the Wholesale Level 2010) 
 
There are valid arguments for both views on the appropriate valuation of demand response 
in day-ahead markets, and some of the main arguments are acknowledged even by the 
opposing side (Falk and Rosenzweig, Critique Betrays Misperception of Purpose of 
Demand Response 2011). The formal correctness of the LMP-G argument is recognized 
despite supporting FERC’s decision of remunerating demand response for full LMP. The 
key points of LMP-G argument are described to be valid, especially in the case when G 
is only slightly less than LMP. At the same time, there is a wide range of inefficiencies 
in the market, and demand response is likely to be under-rewarded for the various services 
it provides. (Falk, Paying for Demand-Side response at the Wholesale Level 2010) 
(ACER 2014). There are many benefits for adopting demand response as reported in sev-
eral high level reports (ACER 2014) (International Energy Agency 2011) (Smart Grid 
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Task Force 2015). The market structure design should be the result of careful compre-
hensive assessment instead of putative benefits. For these reasons, it would seem that the 
LMP-G approach at pricing is suboptimal from a wider perspective and we should pay 
the full market price for demand response. After examining these largely distinct opinions 
on proper valuation of demand response, it should be understood that the issue has a sig-
nificant political account in addition besides the quantitative or economic factors. As de-
scribed above, the European Commission’s view favors paying the full market price for 
demand response similarly to FERC’s decision on the North-American markets. At the 
same time, the current suppliers of electricity can be expected to object this ruling, since 
it can possibly decrease their profits. On the other hand, the experience so far has shown 
that we are unlikely to reach the desired levels of demand response without paying full 
market price for this resource. In the end, it is possible that we have to sacrifice part of 
one market player’s benefits in order to obtain the optimal outcome. The decision is left 
to be resolved by the legislators, and further studies regarding the most beneficial solution 
will be needed.  
 
As a response for the possible imperfections regarding demand response pricing, it is also 
suggested to conduct a net benefits test to mitigate market interference since “a poorly 
designed demand response compensation system could do more harm than good” (Hogan, 
Demand Response Compensation, Net Benefits and Cost Allocation: Preliminary 
Comments 2010). Similar arguments can also be found in some other publications (R. L. 
Borlick 2010) (Chao 2010). Regardless of the view on the value of demand response, 
there seems to be a common understanding of considering the net benefits before taking 
any specific action in implementing demand response. According to FERC’s ruling, the 
accepted day-ahead demand response programs have to pass a net benefits test, which 
determines that the compensation at full LMP is available only, when the LMP is suffi-
ciently high to guarantee that the benefits exceed the costs. The correct level of LMP to 
ensure net benefits is calculated each month and informed to the participants before bid-
ding. (FERC 2011) (FERC 2015)  
 
Regardless of FERC’s decision to estimate the net benefits of offering demand response, 
there is some question regarding the validity of such calculations on a larger scale. Cal-
culating the benefits of demand response is a very challenging task, and often performed 
at too narrow perspective, concentrating too little on the financial value delivered to the 
power system as a whole (U.S. Department of Energy 2006). In addition, there has been 
lack of a comprehensive method for estimating the total effects regardless of the market 
setting across all players while most studies have concentrated on estimating the individ-
ual benefits only for few of the many stakeholders (Su and Kirschen 2009) (Kah-Hoe and 
G.B. 1998) (Parvania and Firuzabad, Demand Response Scheduling by Stochastic SCUC 
2010). (Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012) It would seem that there is a call for more specific 
elaboration of the idea of estimating the total benefits of demand response as introduced 
by FERC.  
 
Without a proper assessment of the demand response bids and their effect, there is a risk 
of it being disadvantageous at the larger level. The decision to dispatch demand response 
should reflect the value it can provide for the system. In this case, discovering the value 
is however complicated due to the nature of the scheme and requires specific assessment. 
There is however a model available, which takes into account the whole scheme instead 
of concentrating on only some of the participants. This assessment framework aims at 
recognizing and calculating the net benefits for the system a whole. Due to the different 
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possible modes of operation for demand response ranging from the TSO-enabled services 
to market-based retail-models, there have to multiple different calculation methods, 
which are adapted to be suitable for each of these models. The model is designed so that 
one can elaborate the basic framework according to the requirements set by the market 
conditions or model. (Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012) Due to the scope of the study and 
the selected market model, a look is taken especially at the retailer-based model, which 
is suitable also for the market models described in Chapter 3.1.2. 
 
The main idea of the assessment framework is based on having a two-step cost/benefit 
analysis. These steps are in-market and out-market. The in-market deals with parties, 
which are participating in the demand response market such as the aggregator or supplier, 
while the out-market estimates the benefits of parties, which are not in direct involvement 
with the market such as the TSO or generators in the case of this study. It should be 
understood that the same framework can be modified to assess the benefits under all the 
various different demand response schemes by exchanging the roles for the in-market or 
out-market calculations to match the desired market model. The additional benefits oc-
curring to the out-market parties are considered to be free, since the parties enjoy the 
benefits without actually paying for them. The analysis is performed during a time period, 
T, which coincides with the generation dispatch interval in the markets. Within this pe-
riod, the analysis is performed for both of the steps. The framework assesses the social 
surplus based on the two steps, after which a decision is made, whether the cleared de-
mand response is dispatched at all. Disregarding demand response bids, which are unable 
to provide a net benefit on a large scale is extremely important because without a proper 
evaluation the full potential of the schemes cannot be reached. In addition, the overall 
efficiency of the markets can be threatened without limiting the counterproductive de-
mand response offers. (Negnevitsky, Nguyen and De Groot 2010) (Nguyen, Negnevitsky 
and de Groot 2011) (Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012) A flow chart of the framework is 
presented in Figure 13. 
 
The calculations in the both of the steps is based on cost/benefit analysis (Mishan and 
Quah 2007) (Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012). The market analysis method is formed us-
ing a specified mathematical function for each of the market participants. This function 
represents the market conditions, and by combining these independent functions we can 
assess the big picture ergo total benefit. The input data for these calculations consisting 
of retail prices, generation costs and failure rates etc. can be obtained from the markets 
and the market operators,. It has been recognized that the calculations required for such 
assessments can be time consuming and complex, and the scientific studies have had no 
limitations regarding simulation time or trial amount in their computational analyses. In 
real market situations however, the efficiency of these calculations should be taken into 
account so that the methods are really applicable in their intended uses. It was discovered 
that the time required for calculating the market clearing model was small using GAMS 
–programming. This is a result of the demand and supply curves being linear and thus 
having convex and quadratic forms, which can be solved with relatively low effort. 
(Nguyen and Negnevitsky 2012)    
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Figure 13. Flow chart of the framework for comprehensive evaluation of demand re-
sponse resources according to the retailer-based model. An elaboration of (Nguyen and 
Negnevitsky 2012) 
 
The framework illustrated in Figure 13 presents a framework, which is capable for as-
sessing the total financial benefits for demand response. Due to the adaptability of the 
model in multiple different scenarios, and the focus on reaching optimal net benefits, it 
seems that having a model like this is essential in creating a functional demand response 
market, which in turn would be able to provide all the potential expected benefits. The 
functionality of this model appears to be evident, and it would seem plausible to use it as 
the basis in the future development of the demand response valuation schemes.  
 
The functionality of the model however does not take into account the costs that would 
incur in creating such a framework to be constantly in use in the markets. Applying new 
structures can be expected to cause expenses, and thus also face opposition. The devel-
opment of these measures is likely to cause expenses, which in the end would be paid by 
the market participants in the form of increased payments. While it is understandable that 
there is no major willingness to create additional structures causing expenses, it should 
be emphasized that there is a high level understanding of the need to introduce flexibility 
resources in the markets (ACER 2014) (Smart Grid Task Force 2015). For this reason, 
the situation should be considered on a longer timescale. Any alteration in the current 
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scheme will cause expenses, and having demand response required some additional layers 
of complexity. If we were to introduce flexibility without fulfilling the requirements, we 
risk ending up in a situation, where some individual market participants gain profits, but 
the system as a whole has a negative impact on the markets. Based on this argumentation, 
creating a system to evaluate the net benefits of demand response would seem to be re-
quired. In any case, the schemes should be designed to operate without excessive work-
force and special attention should be given to minimizing the expenses in applying and 
design of these structures. 
 
3.1.2 Market Models for Demand Response 
The electricity market conduct rules are a result of the liberalization of the markets as 
described in Chapter 2.1.3. It is evident that these rules were created in an era, when 
demand response was not considered thoroughly as a resource. Because of this, the cur-
rent market rules might need to be revised in order to sufficiently enable demand response 
programs’ operation. According to the current legislation, demand response can in fact 
be provided, but only by the current suppliers, thus removing the possibility of having a 
third party aggregator. (The Finnish Government 2013) Before revising the market rules, 
there should however be an understanding of the desired outcome. A market model refers 
to the agreed policies and procedures between the market players according to which the 
different compensations, data and electricity flows are directed. The aim of this chapter 
is to take a look at the different models and their effects on the markets. The models and 
their functions are then reflected against the Nordic market features as well as the basic 
principles of electricity market design in order to find the optimal solution. It should be 
also noted that while the contents of this chapter bear close resemblance and are linked 
to the convictions presented earlier, they are two different subjects. The research concern-
ing valuation examined in Chapter 3.1.1 is an economic analysis of the effects regarding 
how demand response is valued in the markets. This chapter instead concentrates on the 
transactions or compensations between the market parties regardless of the valuation of 
demand response on the market. Due to the similarities between these two aspects, the 
situation is likely to create confusion and thus has to be emphasized. 
 
The most prominent issue in designing the market model is the problem regarding the 
effect demand response might have on the balance responsible party, when the demand 
response is organized partially or completely by a third party such as an independent 
aggregator. This issue is recognized by a diverse group of stakeholders (Eurelectric 2014) 
(ACER 2014) (Finnish Energy Industries 2014). At the same time, there are substantial 
benefits to be made by allowing third party aggregation to participate. In addition, intro-
ducing such a novel market instrument is likely to require resources, which can be 
achieved by pooling the demand as in the aggregated solutions. (Makkonen and Lahdelma 
1999) (ACER 2015) (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) The issue is a result of overlapping 
responsibilities regarding the balancing of the end-user of electricity. When a customer 
agrees to a contract with a third party aggregator, this third party gets an implicit access 
to the organized electricity markets on behalf of this customer. By the mandate given by 
this agreement, the aggregator is allowed to bid the value of the consumer’s consumption 
flexibility or injection to the markets. Within these markets, this injection of electricity or 
shifted consumption is treated as MWh of energy. The problem lies in the fact that at the 
same time, the customer has a supplier, often also having the role of a balance responsible 
party. (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) 
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The supplier is required to source an amount of electricity in the day-ahead market, which 
is equal to the expected consumption of its consumer as explained in Chapter 2.1.4. As a 
result of this, the power balance is maintained. However, should the aggregator have of-
fered a flexibility bid to the market which is then cleared and put into effect, the level of 
consumption changes according to the bid. As a result of this, the balance responsible 
party (the supplier) will not receive payment for the electricity it sourced on the market 
beforehand. What this means is that the supplier has a changed energy position and is left 
in a situation, where it has sourced electricity in order to fulfill the regulated duties and 
which it now is unable to sell. In addition to this, the action taken by the aggregator causes 
a change in the consumption, which in turn creates imbalance in the balancing portfolio. 
This imbalance is compensated as a monetary transaction by the balance responsible 
party, even though the the imbalance would be caused by the aggregator. (SEDC 2015c) 
(Smart Grid Task Force 2015) As it is, the market rules would “de facto” allow a system-
atic method for the aggregator to profit by causing expenses to a separate market player. 
Following this reasoning, is clear that this is an issue to be solved by market design or 
regulatory action before implementing demand response at a wider scale. The challenge 
is in designing fair rules, which both remove unfair costs and at the same time allow 
lucrative participation for demand response programs. As described in the previous chap-
ters, there have been some issues regarding the small level of participation for demand 
response due to unnecessarily low compensation. This emphasizes the need for creating 
a simple method without complicating the system too much. There are a few different 
solutions available for this inherent problem in the design of balance responsibility in the 
Nordic electricity markets. A look will now be taken at these options to assess their ap-
plicability as well as benefits and disadvantages. Each of these models is analyzed based 
on the suitability for the Nordic markets, and the market model is presented in an illus-
tration highlighting the relations between the market players. Since there are various and 
partially overlapping market and compensation models, the variant options and their ra-
tionale are summarized in Figure 16. 
 
The first option would be to simply oblige the customer to sell the flexibility only to his 
own retailer (Eurelectric 2014) (Eurelectric 2015).  This simplest market model nomi-
nated as the Cooperation model, and it is presented in Figure 14. In practice this means, 
that the supplier or BRP has to assume the role of the aggregator or alternatively to work 
in close cooperation with it. By forcing the demand response transactions to only take 
place between the current supplier, there is no possibility for unfair costs to occur. The 
model is based on the supplier assuming the role of the aggregator. Instead of merely 
sourcing the electricity according to the estimated level of demand, the supplier in this 
model would continuously assess the cost-efficiency of sourcing the electricity or acti-
vating demand response within the end-user portfolio. In addition to this model, the same 
model allows operating using a hybrid model, which incorporates features from more 
complicated schemes while still fitting in the basic model. This means that the aggregator 
could also assume the role of a consultant or a technical facilitator by selling the services 
to the supplier. (Eurelectric 2015)  
 
The basic model does not incorporate aggregators bidding on the markets on behalf of the 
customer, the inclusion of third parties is however possible, just as long as the require-
ments of this model are met. There is a bit more advanced market model based on this 
method created by the Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF), which is an organi-
zation created by several energy companies. This hybrid model consists of several differ-
ent data flows as well as defining the roles and responsibilities for each party, but the 
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main idea is simple. The supplier and the aggregator work together and sign a contract 
for an aggregator to provide services. This contract includes the operating conditions, 
under which the aggregator acts under the flag of the supplier. This means, that even 
though there was an aggregator, it is considered as a subcontractor of the supplier instead 
of a third separate party. Under this USEF model, the optimization of the portfolio is 
conducted in cooperation between the aggregator and supplier to find the lowest opera-
tional costs. (USEF 2015) 
 
 
Figure 14. Demand response market model, where the supplier or BRP takes the role of 
the aggregator or operates in cooperation with it. 
 
The main benefit of this simplest model of limiting the demand response activities to the 
own supplier is that the chain of balance responsibility remains intact. Regardless of par-
ticipating in demand response activities, the customer has only one contact point, and no 
additional costs occur due to the possible demand response actions. The supplier or BRP, 
or alternatively the consortium of supplier and aggregator estimate the demand according 
to the customers’ needs, market situation and available flexibility, resulting in precise 
balancing. The only market model based potential impact in need of special management 
would be the link between the supplier and the DSO, which is symbolized using the 
dashed arrow in Figure 14 (Eurelectric 2015). The demand response activities have an 
effect in the distribution network, which has to adapt to the changes caused by demand 
response activation. The effect of this impact can however be expected to be minor at 
least in this simplest market model. Even without demand response activities, the supplier 
has to operate within the limitations of the network, and since the demand response ac-
tivities are organized by one single consortium, the estimated demand level is likely to be 
accurate. In some inefficient or undeveloped networks, there however might still be con-
gestions limiting the participation for demand response. A more detailed analysis of the 
network requirements can be found in this chapter after discussing the various market 
models. 
 
Examining the model raises a question of the efficiency of operating the demand response 
markets. If we adopt a model, where the aggregator and supplier have to operate as a 
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single entity, do we limit the development of new aggregators or aggregating services? 
(ACER 2015) There are several high level studies, which emphasize the need to accept 
diverse flexibility resources and versatile actors in the upcoming demand response mar-
kets. Allowing consumers to offer their flexibility using any possible means is also en-
couraged. The Smart Grid Task Force states: “All aggregation service providers must be 
able to compete on a level playing field: aggregated load should be legal, facilitated and 
enabled in all markets. Aggregators and suppliers should have the same ability to extract 
the value of flexibility services on behalf of their consumers.” (ACER 2014) (Smart Grid 
Task Force 2015) (CEER 2014) As discussed in Chapter 2.1, competition and rival parties 
in the markets encourage the efficiency. New entrant aggregators are in fact allowed to 
assume the role of a BRP or supplier and hence are allowed to operate in the markets. 
Should a new entrant aggregator be willing to assume the role of both supplier and aggre-
gator, it is required to fulfil a list of specific requirements specified in the electricity mar-
ket act (The Finnish Government 2009). After being accepted as a BRP, the new market 
player would be allowed to operate as the supplier and aggregator. The question remains 
whatsoever, whether the requirements still cause an unnecessarily high barrier regarding 
the entrance of new market participants. These requirements consist of technical facilities 
to manage the responsibilities of the task. In the developed Nordic markets, where smart 
metering and dynamic pricing is already available, the barrier of assuming the role of a 
BRP can be considered to be relatively low (Eurelectric 2015) (NordREG 2014).   
 
The second model incorporates a separate third party aggregator, which is operating 
independently. The aggregator is in direct contact with the customer, and performs de-
mand response activities on the electricity markets. The aggregator is allowed to operate 
independently without consent or agreement of the supplier and can be considered to act 
as a service provider for the customer, which has an impact on the BRP’s balance as 
described above. (Eurelectric 2015) (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) In order to engage in 
market activities according to the second model, there have to be precise rules for the 
interaction between these actors. The second market model is presented in Figure 15. 
There are multiple different solutions for the intrinsic problems of allowing a third party 
aggregator to operate in the markets. The study will now take a look at these options and 
assess their applicability for the Nordic electricity markets.   
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Figure 15. Demand response market model, where the aggregator is an independent third 
party, visualizing the impact a third party aggregator has on different parties.  
 
There are a couple of different options on how to compensate the supplier for the negative 
consequences of demand response, which can be divided into two main categories:  
 
1. The first option is nominated as the imbalance compensation model. It is based 
on an idea, in which the BRP or supplier imbalance is not neutralized, but instead 
the imbalance is compensated by the aggregator at the imbalance price through 
the TSO.  In addition, the BRP would not be penalized for imbalances, which 
support the system requirements. (Eurelectric 2015) From the BRP’s point of view 
this model increases the risks of operation, since their compensation in this model 
depends on the imbalance price. Should the sourcing costs exceed the imbalance 
compensation, the demand response event would create operating losses for the 
BRP/supplier. Even more alarming in this model is the fact that operating accord-
ing to the imbalance compensation model would allow the third party to cause 
these additional costs at any given time regardless of the supplier’s consent or 
market situation. Having this kind of power over another market participant is 
likely to cause imperfect competition leading to a total welfare loss. (Wangesteen 
2005) Regardless of these possible market failures inherent to this model, it would 
seem that operating according to this model is possible, provided that the actions 
are limited to the balancing markets only. However, the fact that the model cannot 
be expanded to include the day-ahead or intraday markets makes it unfavourable 
to adopt. Adopting the imbalance compensation model would complicate the mar-
ket by demanding two separate models only to cover the different market seg-
ments.  
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2. The second option is to neutralize the imbalance created by the third party aggre-
gators. The imbalance is neutralized by the TSO, and the BRP or supplier is then 
compensated for the energy, which is re-routed and sold to the markets by the 
aggregator. It should be noted that this solution shares resemblance to the discus-
sion in Chapter 3.1.1. In this chapter, the focus is however on determining the 
possible compensations between market parties regardless of the price in the mar-
kets. This option to neutralize the imbalance can be divided further into three dif-
ferent models according to the compensation method: A corrected model, a regu-
lated model and a contractual model. It should be also kept in mind that all market 
players should operate under the same responsibilities. Consequently, any third 
party aggregator bidding demand response on the markets should also have bal-
ance responsibility. If a customer is unable to deliver the response according to 
the demand response bid, the aggregator bears the imbalance cost.  (Eurelectric 
2015) (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) What this means in practice, is that there is 
a need for one single consumer to divide the balancing responsibility between two 
different actors: the aggregator and the supplier, or at least create a mechanism 
which would ensure that no unjust compensations have to be made. 
 
The corrected model is based on the aggregator refunding the amount of energy 
that has been “sold” to the aggregator in the form of demand response. The me-
tering data of a customer in this model is corrected by the amount of activated 
demand response. What this means is that the customers remunerate their own 
supplier using their contracted rates for the specific amount of energy. The cus-
tomers in turn are compensated by the aggregator for the demand reduction.  
(Eurelectric 2015) A more thorough evaluation of the proper compensation value 
of demand response can be found in Chapter 3.1.1.  It is evident that the advantage 
of this model is its inherent simplicity. The model does not require any additional 
processes or complicated calculation, and can hence be considered to be relatively 
transparent and easy to understand. It does however require exact metering for 
both consumption as well as demand response in order to be transparent and reli-
able. This should not be an issue in the Nordic markets with a wide coverage of 
smart metering (NordREG 2014). Eurelectric has stated that applying this model 
might be difficult for smaller customers (Eurelectric 2015). No issues are however 
seen in operating according to the corrected model with small-scale electricity-
users. Advanced metering and telecommunications enable easy handling of a wide 
range of users, which is the main idea of aggregation in the first place. Lucrative 
demand response is often dependent on accessing the reduction potential of mul-
tiple end-users, which is why Eurelectric’s statement about applying this to small 
consumers would seem somewhat biased (Parvania, Optimal Demand Response 
Aggregation in Wholesale Electricity markets 2013) (Smart Grid Task Force 
2015).  
 
The regulated model introduces a slightly firmer regulatory framework on the 
compensation. The BRP or supplier is compensated by the aggregator at a regu-
lated price level. The compensation price in the model is set by the national regu-
latory authority at a level, which at minimum would cover the costs of the com-
modity. (Eurelectric 2015) The model raises a question, whether the design actu-
ally inhibits the pricing innovations conducted by the aggregator. Determining the 
proper compensation price is also likely to be challenging, and demands re-
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sources. Should the compensation price be constantly changing, even more re-
sources are used for this action, which in fact could be naturally achieved on open 
markets without unnecessary expenses. There is also a risk of creating an arbitrage 
on the markets, since the compensation is not determined strictly by market con-
ditions. An arbitrage refers to a situation, where the simultaneous purchase and 
sale of an asset allows profit due to the price difference. It occurs naturally due to 
market inefficiencies, but in this case the design of the market model can be seen 
as the source of the arbitrary conditions, and distorting the markets. (Luenberger 
2013) (Wangesteen 2005) In addition to the problems mentioned, the compensa-
tion price might not ensure proper compensation for the supplier, since the com-
pensation price can differ from the contract price of the customer. Regardless of 
the model’s limitations, it is currently in use in the French markets (RTE 2015) 
(RTE 2014).  
 
The contractual model is founded on the third party aggregator and the BRP or 
supplier having a common agreement on the level and methods of compensation. 
Each demand response event is then compensated according to this contract. 
(Eurelectric 2015)Having these contracts should not limit the customer’s right to 
select their own service provider without consent from the supplier. Designing a 
contractual model raises also a question of the details of these agreements. Euro-
pean Commission recommends putting in place standard contracts to ensure the 
functionality of the model as well as the required communication procedures. 
(Smart Grid Task Force 2015) Standardizing the framework and contracts can be 
expected to encourage the adoption of demand response during the roll-out phase. 
Special attention should however be given to designing such contracts, that they 
allow for various kinds of agreements between the players instead of merely lock-
ing the model into a predefined state. Market opportunities are often created as 
new innovations, which can be inadvertently disqualified when applying unnec-
essarily strict standards. Should the contractual model be the optimal solution, it 
is likely that these market specific guidelines be defined by the national regulatory 
authority, Energiavirasto, or the Nordic regulators’ board NordREG. Designing 
fair and equitable standards poses an important challenge for the regulators. 
 
The drawbacks of the contractual model are associated with the possible excessive 
market power given to the BRP or supplier. If this model is the only possibility 
for demand response, the supplier is able to control the levels of compensation, 
and the third party aggregator would have to either agree with this level, or give 
up the demand response operations. Another alternative would be to begin acting 
as a supplier and applying for the balance responsibility status. This however 
would not fall under this market model anymore, but would be considered as op-
erating under the cooperation model. At the same time the aggregator would be 
given additional responsibilities and tasks. As described in Chapter 2.1, it should 
be kept in mind that from a market perspective it is lucrative to have multiple 
participants to compete. Having competition is likely to streamline the operations 
leading to efficiency. The situation should also be considered regarding speciali-
zation. The reason for having diverse companies interacting with each other is that 
the companies are specialized to perform a task, in which they are best at produc-
ing value. The most efficient outcome can be achieved when each individual 
player concentrates on the things they do best, and outsourcing those things, which 
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are easier or cheaper to outsource. (Parkin 2014) Let’s take demand response ag-
gregation as an example. If a market player is very efficient at aggregating load 
and controlling it for instance by having sophisticated software and competitive 
staff for this thing in particular. At the same time it is possible that the require-
ments for sourcing electricity and acting as a supplier does not meet with their 
resources. In this case the optimal outcome could be achieved by the contractual 
model, where the aggregator is only responsible for what they do best. Regardless 
of the argumentation, it can also be that the aggregator or even supplier is profi-
cient at handling both tasks. In that case it might be best to have only one actor. 
Regardless of the situation, forcing the actors to take responsibility of tasks in 
which they are incompetent will most likely lead to suboptimal end result. This is 
why having the contractual market model as the only option cannot be recom-
mended. 
 
It is important to understand, that operating demand response on any of the three models 
based on compensating the energy to the supplier is dependent on a method to verify the 
amount of energy, which has been “re-routed” as demand response. (Eurelectric 2015) 
The compensation is determined according to the amount of demand reduction, which 
highlights the importance of transparent and accurate methods for measuring it. The 
measurement and verification of demand response is examined in Chapter 3.1.3. Regard-
less of the model selected, the main idea in all these options is having a financial adjust-
ment mechanism to compensate the losses. The European Commission’s Expert Group 
regarding flexibility has defined two main principles for applying such financial adjust-
ment methods; Firstly, the adjustment for the energy should always reflect the sourcing 
costs.  Secondly, the adjustment should ensure that risks and costs are directed to the party 
that causes the risks and costs. The market mechanism should thus ensure that all elec-
tricity sourced on the market and consumed by end customers is paid to the actor, who 
sourced it. At the same time, the unfair costs incurred through fulfilling the balancing 
requirements should be avoided. (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) 
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Figure 16. Comparing the various market models for demand response 
 
 
After taking a look at the various possible market models, their suitability regarding the 
Nordic markets should be assessed in order to find the optimal design. There are robust 
guidelines for creating the market design in order to realize the full potential of demand 
response described in Chapter 1.2. The market design should ensure a level playing field 
for all actors, a market design, which is suitable for all markets and scalable for imple-
menting on the large scale (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) (Eurelectric 2015). A level 
playing field is generally understood as subjecting same market and participation rules 
for all of the market players. It is important to notice that creating a level playing field 
does not mean that the market design should necessarily be limited to only one model. It 
might be beneficial to put in place several possible participation models for demand re-
sponse, just as long as all of the models are available for any of the market players. By 
accepting multiple different operating models, we are enabling more participants to take 
part in the markets, which leads to more efficient operation as described in Chapter 2.1. 
The participant is able to select the most optimal form of delivering demand response, 
and the respective market rules for this kind of activities ensure that the possible external 
costs are compensated. Based on this argumentation, the recommended solution for Nor-
dic markets should consist of a combination of models, allowing the participation of di-
verse parties, provided that having only one market model does not bring about superior 
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benefits. Special attention should also be given to designing a combination of models, 
which does not have contradicting and overlapping qualities. 
 
The final recommendation for the market model is formed by first recognizing the most 
counterproductive or unavailing choices from the basic market models listed in Figure 
16. The remaining options are then examined regarding their suitability to be applied as 
alternatives, out of which a market participant could select the most suitable one for their 
use. It should be kept in mind, that all of these basic models are designed so that they 
fulfill the requirement of removing the injurious market effects. At this stage, the com-
parison is made thinking only about the suitability of the model for the participation of 
diverse demand-response resources. 
 
Let´s first take a closer look at the regulated model. Implementing this model in the Nor-
dic electricity markets would mean a major rollback from the modern liberalized system. 
Despite actually being in use at the moment in France, it is conflicting with the idea of 
capturing efficiency by market competition. (RTE 2014) (RTE 2015) (Hunt and 
Shuttleworth 1996)  The model can also be interpreted as being against the European 
Commission’s third energy package market reforms, and there is a very clear opposition 
to having regulated prices of any kind (ACER/CEER 2013) (European Commission 
2009). It is hence highly unlikely that an optimal outcome could be achieved by operating 
by this model. In addition, calculating the supposedly appropriate price levels for demand 
response would constantly demand a lot of resources for a task, which could be achieved 
naturally in the markets and most probably with a higher accuracy. In addition, regulating 
the prices is bound to limit the aggregators’ innovations concerning pricing. For these 
reasons, the regulated model will be disqualified as an option in designing the Nordic 
demand response market model. 
 
The imbalance compensation model is a simple model based on compensating the bal-
ancing error for the BRP or supplier. The simplicity of the model might actually not be a 
benefit in itself, since the whole model can be considered to ignore the drawbacks created 
by demand response. Using this model, every flexibility event would create balancing 
error, which is then financially reimbursed. This financial payment does remove the un-
just effects for the third party, but it still does not remove the balancing problem. The 
reason for having balancing and paying for deviations stems from network requirements 
(Fingrid 2015). Designing a regulatory scheme, which simply ignores the negative effects 
for the network using a financial compensation would seem to be counterproductive and 
absurd, especially if there are other alternatives for the market design. From the supplier’s 
or BRP’s point of view this model would also pose a major risk, since they would simply 
have to agree to the compensation level without any possibility of control. This would 
increase the risk without any kind of a compensation for the BRP. It could also be argued, 
whether this model even provides a solution to the endogenous problem in demand re-
sponse of having unfair effects for a third party in the first place. The balancing error is 
indeed solved, but this solution would in turn create an additional problem regarding risk 
management while doing so. Due to the deficiencies described above, the imbalance com-
pensation model is also ruled out from the considerations regarding an optimal market 
model.  
 
How about the corrected model. The model is based on compensating the energy losses 
for the supplier/BRP. This compensation for the energy would be paid by the aggregators 
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according to the amount of sourced but not consumed energy because of demand re-
sponse. As a result of aggregator purchasing the energy, the balancing error caused by 
demand response would be corrected. Any additional imbalances would naturally be paid 
by the supplier/BRP themselves. At the same time the supplier would be paid a fair price 
for the energy, thus also solving the problem regarding the supplier´s open energy posi-
tion. Let’s examine this transaction more closely. As an example, we assume that the 
BRP/supplier has purchased a position for 10 MWh of energy in the electricity markets 
in order to meet the expected demand of its customer base. After this purchase, the ag-
gregator asks its consumers to reduce consumption by 2 MWh, and compensates the 
BRP/supplier for the energy. This transaction can be interpreted as the aggregator pur-
chasing the energy from the supplier, even though it is in fact created by the consumers’ 
reduction in consumption. This exemplary transaction between the two parties and mar-
kets is presented in Figure 17. By examining the situation, it is evident that the possibility 
for an aggregator to make any kind of profitable business is dependent on having two 
different prices. What this means is that the transactions have to take place in two different 
markets where the supplier first sources the energy, and secondly the aggregator resells 
this energy to the markets. What is found important to understand here is the fact that 
demand response is likely to be able to produce more value as it gets closer to the delivery 
hour. If there is demand for electricity and a lack of adequate supply, reducing the demand 
is an easy way to make profit – provided that one has the resources to do so. This is 
because demand response would not require proactive planning, but could be simply ac-
tivated by real-time control of the consumers’ appliances. The aggregator according to 
this model is in fact reselling the energy for a better price due to the supplier’s inability 
to steer it to a more profitable end-use, which is bound to increase the efficiency of the 
system as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 17. The monetary and energy transactions between the BRP/supplier, aggregator 
and the consumers in a demand response event according to the corrected model 
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It should however be noted that the corrected model does have an effect on the suppliers’ 
profit, because reducing the amount of energy sold to the consumers also means that they 
are unable to charge the contribution margin from the customers for the part of energy 
which is sold to the aggregator. According to the model, only the sourcing costs will be 
reimbursed and thus introducing a separate aggregator might not be viewed as a positive 
change among the current suppliers. The fact that a supplier would lose some profits is 
an understandable motivation, but does not suffice as an argument for preventing changes. 
Especially when these changes would enable a more diverse supply in the markets and 
more efficient operation. It could also be argued, whether there is even need for a separate 
compensation for the sold energy to the supplier. There is currently an ongoing political 
debate regarding the rationale for having such payments in the European Commission 
based on the idea that the payments reduce the aggregators’ revenues too much compared 
to the net benefits as discussed in Chapter 3.1.1. In the end, it all comes down to the 
questions of whether there is need for having third party aggregators in the demand re-
sponse markets and the assessment of the ratio between the profits of doing so and the 
cost of making the required changes in the markets. The model does in fact require some 
changes in the balancing calculations in order to correct the supplier’s balance for the part 
of resold energy. These changes and the related expenses are discussed further in Chapter 
3.2.1. 
 
The need for having third party aggregators is indeed recognized, and a central part of 
allowing flexibility resources to be treated on an equal basis with existing resources in 
the full range of electricity markets (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) (ACER 2014). Intro-
ducing the possibility of a separate aggregator is very likely to encourage the adoption 
of demand response services among the current suppliers. This is because there now 
would be a possibility for a new entrant to assume part of the current suppliers’ profits. 
In addition to this, introducing new players to the markets will increase competition as a 
whole, which will further enable the advancement of adopting demand response as a re-
source as described in Chapter 2.1. What is however found to be the most important 
thing is to understand that enabling third party aggregators might provide unexpected 
new entrants an access in the markets. Demand response, compared to traditional energy 
production and supply, is a very different method requiring partially different resources 
and knowledge. Should an innovative company be able to produce for instance software 
or a device able to optimize the consumption of electricity at a low cost, it can be ar-
gued, whether there should be an easy possibility for them to realize this potential with-
out having to take the whole burden of the supplier. 
 
On the other hand, the current supplier could in fact also be interpreted as being an ag-
gregator as it is, which brings forward the argument of why would we want to introduce 
an additional separate and similar player in the markets. The supplier is in fact gathering 
together a large group of electricity end-users, and optimizing their consumption – just as 
an aggregator would. To continue this reasoning, if demand response is able to offer better 
compensation, ergo a higher price in the markets, wouldn’t the suppliers be naturally 
willing to offer it to the markets themselves? According to market economics, the partic-
ipant aims for the most profitable means of operation and it is evident that every supplier 
would be interested in offering demand response if the compensation is at a desirable 
level (Wangesteen 2005) (Parkin 2014). There are two main questions regarding this 
thought; Are the current suppliers able to create and provide demand response services 
themselves, and can the balancing responsibility requirements of a market participant be 
interpreted as a barrier for entry in the markets. 
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At the current price levels the profit margin of demand response can be considered to be 
very low, which can be assumed to hinder the development of flexibility services or at 
least the interest to these projects among the current suppliers (NordPoolSpot 2015a). 
Even though the price paid for electricity would increase, it should also be considered, 
whether a supplier has the capabilities for producing this kind of service. Creating new 
operating policies in electricity supply companies, which are used to working according 
to the current principles might prove out to be problematic. In addition, the profitable 
solution for demand response services might be based on sophisticated professional 
knowledge regarding software, single board miniature computers or home automation 
which might be out of the core competence of the traditional suppliers (Halfacree 2012) 
(Pralahad and Hamel 1990). If there is no willingness or lack of capabilities to develop 
the requisite technologies regarding profitable demand response among the current sup-
pliers, and we offer no possibility for new entrants to come to the markets, the adoption 
of market based commercial services will presumably be very slow. Also because of the 
potential to decrease the revenue the suppliers make, the reception of this model can be 
expected to be somewhat objecting. As mentioned, it should however be kept in mind 
that reaching the optimal situation might come at the expense of some of the current mar-
ket participants and that some negative effects can be considered acceptable provided that 
they produce a net benefit as a whole. 
 
On the other hand, when thinking about the network requirements as an entry barrier it 
should be assessed, whether the burden of fulfilling the requirements of a BRP actually 
is too demanding. Why couldn’t the aggregators simply assume the role of the supplier if 
they are capable of offering similar products at a more profitable cost level? According 
to the current market legislation, it is stated very clear that each electricity market partic-
ipant is responsible to produce or purchase electricity which covers the usage and deliv-
eries during each balancing period (The Finnish Government 2013). In addition, each 
operator in the electricity network needs to fulfill the requirements, which are set to en-
sure the fluent operation of the grid (The Finnish Government 2009). Regarding this, it 
would seem contradictory to allow one single market participant to operate without ful-
filling the requirements of the other market participants. This is also conflicting with the 
ambitions of a level playing field, which means that all market players are subjected to 
the same rules (Kraus 2005) (P. Joskow 1989) (Eurelectric 2015). In any case, enabling 
separate third party aggregation would require redesigning the market legislation and the 
rules of balancing responsibility, which are bound to create some expenses. The situation 
is apparently somewhat challenging. On one hand, enabling third party aggregation is 
encouraged on a very high level as a profitable means to achieve the market benefits. On 
the other, this will definitely not come without some expenses due to the changes in the 
current scheme.  
 
When facing this kind of a situation, with two different options, special attention should 
be given to quantifying the end result of the different scenarios. If it can in fact be verified 
that there are substantial gains to be made by allowing third party aggregation and the 
current suppliers are merely avoiding change in order to protect their current revenue 
streams, the changes should definitely be made. There are multiple studies regarding the 
net benefits of demand response in the European markets as a whole focusing on the 
potential of the various demand response schemes combined, but what is still missing is 
a numeric estimate of the effect of enabling a third party aggregator in the Nordic elec-
tricity markets (Gils 2014) (EWI 2012) (Booz & Co 2013). For this reason, it would be 
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recommended to conduct a further study, which would simulate the situation at various 
electricity price and demand variables before making the decision of applying the com-
pensation model. The aim of this would be to estimate the expected benefits, which could 
then be compared to the expenses that applying the required changes would cause.  
 
The benefit of the corrected model is its relative simplicity, even though implementing it 
would require changes in the balancing model. Implementing demand response schemes 
according to this model would likely enhance the adoption of demand response resources 
among the current suppliers since the model enables the third party to compete for the 
flexibility provided. For instance, a recent PJM Market Activity report stated that 82% of 
the demand response capacity in that market is provided by independent aggregators. It 
has been also recognized that no market has been able to implement demand response 
successfully grasping the full potential without having third party aggregators, and with-
out combining the individual customer’s pooled flexibility, it might be difficult to operate 
such a scheme in a profitable manner. (PJM 2015) (SEDC 2015a) (SEDC 2015b) 
(Makkonen and Lahdelma 1999) At the same time, the exact quantitative benefits of the 
model as a whole in the Nordic markets remain unclear, and the validity of having a mar-
ket participant operating in the markets without balance or network responsibility can be 
likely to cause some issues. It is also important to note, that the model does not apply to 
markets, which do not remunerate energy such as capacity markets, reserve markets or 
other demand response functions, which are outside the scope of this study (SEDC 
2015a). The functionality of this model can be achieved in day-ahead and intraday mar-
kets or balancing products with energy payments, which is why the suitability for the 
Nordic electricity markets can be expected to be fairly high, should the required changes 
in the policies be made. The corrected model addresses the treatment of separate third 
party aggregators, and can be implemented in the Nordic market structure, which is why 
it can in fact be recommended as a solution. In addition, the model can be expected to be 
relatively easy to implement because of the high extent of smart metering in the markets. 
The realized flexibility would however still need to be compensated in the balancing 
model, which would mean that there is a need to include a mathematical separation in the 
balancing calculations of the flexibility to neutralize the error. The measurement and ver-
ification of the demand response events is discussed in Chapter 3.1.2. While the corrected 
model can be considered to be a suitable option for the Nordic electricity markets regard-
ing demand response, special attention should be given to assessing how well it can per-
form compared to the intrinsic expenses that occur while introducing this model. It would 
be rational also to assess the effect of the reverse payments to the revenue of the aggre-
gators. There is no use in implementing a model, which aims at enabling third party ag-
gregation, and at the same time makes it financially impossible. 
 
The contractual model and cooperation model have very similar qualities, as they both 
are based on the aggregator and supplier working in some kind of cooperation. The dif-
ferences stem from the actual arrangements of working together, whether it is conducted 
as a separate third party empowered by a contract or as a close partner. For this reason, 
these two models are addressed simultaneously. 
 
Regarding the problem of uncompensated balancing errors, these models can be consid-
ered to be the optimal solution. As addressed in Chapter 2.1.3, the balancing error, is the 
difference between the purchased electricity and the actual delivered electricity. The in-
teraction between the parties removes this problem, because of the close communication 
and planning regarding electricity sourcing. The aggregator is responsible for estimating 
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the amount of demand reduction it is able to produce and for what kind of price for each 
hour similarly to the suppliers estimate the consumption. This estimated amount of energy 
can then be reduced from the required electricity to be sourced in the markets by the 
supplier. Because of this shared forecasting, there will be no additional error in the bal-
ancing due to activating demand response bids, which means that there would be no need 
to change the current balancing model. An another alternative would be to work inde-
pendently and agree on the compensation level for the balancing error in the contract.  
 
There have been arguments to whether also operating according to the cooperation or 
contractual models pose an entry barrier for the new aggregators because of the supplier 
/ BRP dominance over the situation. In both of these models, the aggregator has to agree 
to the terms set by the other party. On the other hand, this party is also the one actually 
potentially suffering from the participation in demand response if the compensation for 
the balancing error is not properly set. Considering this, it would seem justifiable that the 
supplier has a stronger stand in the negotiations. On the other hand, if the aggregator is 
not satisfied with the demands of the supplier, it can also apply for the balance responsi-
bility status and become a supplier themselves. This would mean assuming the whole 
operations of a supplier along with offering the aggregation services. This kind of trans-
formation would mean that the scheme would fall under the category of the cooperation 
model even though there actually is only one market player. Similarly to the aggregator’s 
possibility to assume the suppliers’ responsibilities, the model does not in turn limit the 
supplier from making the decision to offer aggregator services if they think that would be 
the most profitable way to do it. This would naturally further enhance competition be-
tween the parties. Consequently, the risk of an aggregator turning into a competitor would 
likely enhance the current supplier’s willingness to cooperate instead of creating a com-
petitor. In addition, the cooperation of the actors each concentrating on their own area of 
expertise might actually be a benefit instead of a risk. (Schilling 2013) (Pralahad and 
Hamel 1990) Because of this reasoning, the setting in these two models should not be 
interpreted as a barrier for entry. 
 
If we are to operate demand response services according to a model, where two separate 
companies are working in cooperation such as in the contractual, cooperation or compen-
sation model described above, special attention must be given to the roles and responsi-
bilities of each of these parties. (SEDC 2015a) Both of these models rely on having con-
tractual arrangements between the market parties, which further highlights the importance 
of the specifics determined in this contract. The European Commission’s expert group on 
demand response has stated that standard contracts should be put in place to ensure 
smooth contractual process, fair financial adjustment mechanisms and communication 
procedures between the parties. (Smart Grid Task Force 2015) Concerning the role of the 
energy regulators in the electricity markets, defining these procedures would be a tangible 
step towards implementing demand response at a larger scale. By determining the various 
different mandatory aspects that need to be taken care of in order to successfully operate 
demand response services would naturally facilitate the easy adoption of demand re-
sponse. There however still needs to be a distinction between determining the market 
aspects one has to agree on and actually enforcing certain agreements. The aim of deter-
mining this kind of standardized contracts is not to limit the participants’ possibilities for 
creating novel operating procedures. Instead, the main purpose of these contracts would 
be to merely define the aspects, which have to be taken care of while leaving the choice 
of how to agree or compensate for these aspects to be decided between the participants. 
This would mean that the standard agreement would act as a sort of a guidance for the 
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agreements to avoid undesirable outcomes or effects in the markets. As long as the mat-
ters defined in the standard contract have been taken care of or agreed on, any additional 
contracts would be left to be decided by the parties depending on their own wishes and 
capabilities. 
 
Based on this argumentation, the most profitable market model would consist of the co-
operation, corrected and contractual model, out of which the participant would be free to 
select the most suitable mode of operation. Operating according to these enables the par-
ticipation of a wide range of resources, which seems to be evident in order to obtain the 
full benefits of demand response. It should be emphasized that the main idea in this mar-
ket layout is not to impede the operations of the current suppliers, but instead encourage 
competition by allowing all the potential resources take part. In addition to redesigning 
the market model, it would seem profitable for the Nordic energy regulators to form a 
guideline, which would act as the standardized contract for demand response between the 
parties. In the case of a single supplier providing demand response services according to 
the cooperation model there is no need for having such contracts since the supplier is the 
only provider of demand response. In these cases the guideline could however have an 
instructive role on the agreement between the supplier and the customers, which actually 
perform the flexibility. 
 
3.1.3 Measurement and Verification of Demand Response  
As demand response is to be adopted in the Nordic countries on a bigger scale, we need 
to have sufficient means for verifying the flexibility conducted by the consumers. The 
purpose of this chapter is to assess the current methods for measuring demand response 
and the possible need for regulatory intervention, or guidance. There are multiple means 
for calculating the response, and it probably is required to have a common policy for the 
whole market area. The study analyzes the various methods, giving a suggestion to be 
adopted in the Nordic markets. 
 
According to the definition in Chapter 1.1, demand response is the change of electricity 
consumption in reaction to a signal. In other words, the amount of load curtailment in 
demand response is the difference between the actual observed load and the load that 
would have occurred otherwise. This brings about an issue of determining the assumed 
level of load if there were no efforts at reducing the load by flexibility. In order to appraise 
the economical compensation for the response, there has to be a valid procedure for ver-
ifying the amount of response in megawatts. In contrast to the electricity consumed by 
end-users, which can be precisely measured, demand response is however by definition 
subject to some error, which should not be ignored, nor exaggerated. (Goldberg and 
Agnew 2013) The calculation of the response in any case very important, since it acts as 
the basis for calculating the price paid for the DR participants. Estimating the load that 
would have occurred without DR higher than it really would have been results in over-
compensation for the response. Analogously, a lower estimate reduces the payments and 
might lead to customers not participating in demand response in the long run (AEIC Load 
Research Committee 2009). Before introducing demand response programs in the Nordic 
markets, it would be thus required to define a common approach on how to manage this 
intrinsic problem. Let´s first take a look at the measuring principles. 
 
There are various methods for assessing the amount of demand response. Since the aim 
is at defining the operating principles for demand response market participants, the focus 
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here is on measuring and verifying the flexibility on the individual customers’ level.  
There are also tools for measuring the impact of demand response for large groups of 
consumers, which is more suitable for estimating the response potential of a single market 
area etc. These mass market demand response measurement methods are however out of 
the scope regarding the study aims, and therefore will not be addressed.  
 
In order to estimate the amount of reduced consumption, one first has to determine the 
timescale for such an event. This is typically referred to as a demand response event, 
which can be defined as the time periods, deadlines and transitions during which demand 
response resources perform. The significance of such a definition is to set the points of 
time, between which the response is calculated using one of the methods introduced fur-
ther. To measure the load reduction during this timeframe, one has to collect or calculate 
the following two main components; Baseline consumption refers to the amount of elec-
tricity the consumer would have consumed without a signal to reduce consumption and 
actual consumption stands for the amount of electricity the consumer actually consumed 
during the DR event. Both of these are presented in Figure 18. The amount of load re-
duction, ergo demand response, can be calculated as the difference between these two 
components. (AEIC Load Research Committee 2009)  
 
Figure 18. A demand response event and the baseline. An elaboration based on (AEIC 
Load Research Committee 2009) 
 
In the Nordic electricity markets, the adoption of smart meters is high and thus the elec-
tricity consumption can be accurately measured for most of the consumers. Hourly and 
remote metering is possible in most market areas, although there are some differences in 
the adoption level depending on the country. (NordREG 2014) For this reason, the focus 
of the Nordic regulators should be in finding the optimal solution for determining the 
baseline consumption.  
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The baseline consumption calculation method falls under two categories. Type I baseline 
refers to creating the baseline by using historical metering data, weather or calendar data 
and is used when specific customer consumption data is available. Type II baseline in-
stead, is based on statistical pooled sampling and is applicable in markets, where individ-
ual electricity consumption meters are not available, and the consumption has to be esti-
mated based on aggregated metering. This approach however is irrelevant from the Nor-
dic markets’ perspective based on the accurate consumer level metering, and will thus not 
be discussed further in this study. 
 
There are two common techniques for determining the baseline consumption during a DR 
event; day matching and regression analysis. Day matching is based on selecting a base-
line day or time period, which most accurately matches the DR event and estimating the 
baseline according to the recorded hourly data. An average of the historical data is used 
and the baseline estimate is often adjusted according to the current conditions such as 
weather. (AEIC Load Research Committee 2009) There are multiple day matching meth-
ods for evaluating the demand response performance. The study will now introduce some 
of these widely used day matching techniques and the regression analysis method: 
 
The Rolling average method, as described above uses historical metering data, which is 
weighted to match more recent data. The applicability and accuracy of this method de-
pends on the amount of suitable data to represent the conditions. (Holmberg, Hardin and 
Koch 2013) There is also an elaborated version of the rolling average method, the average 
daily energy usage method, which uses daily energy consumption to choose which days 
are included in the calculation and which not. Suitable days for the calculation are deter-
mined by comparing the historical consumption to the day before the demand response 
event. If the consumption is 75% or greater than the consumption one day before the 
event, the daily data is included in the baseline average calculation. Otherwise the data 
will be ignored. This method has been used in the New York ISO (NYISO) day-ahead 
demand response program as well as the PJM demand response operations. (NYISO 
2003) Similarly to this, period averaging creates baselines by averaging selected histori-
cal data, which is considered to represent the current load situation. The method applies 
High/Mid X of Y baselines, where Y is the number of days prior to the event that are 
considered and X is the amount of those days having the highest load for High X of Y or 
middle load for Mid X of Y. These methods have been in use at least in PJM Intercon-
nection electricity markets (High 4 of 5) and Ontario (High 15 of 20). (Holmberg, Hardin 
and Koch 2013) (EnerNOC 2011) These averaging methods can be considered easy to 
understand and the averaging reduces the error caused by the variation in daily loads by 
creating an average consumption curve. At the same time however, this means that the 
baseline created by these methods does not completely depict the usage pattern of the day 
in question, which calls for additional market specific adjustments when using this 
method.  
 
Comparable day or proxy day methods try to find a previous day, which has reminiscent 
circumstances compared to the day for which the baseline is calculated. These circum-
stances can vary from weather conditions to special holidays. The challenge in compara-
ble day methods is in determining the proper objective criteria for selecting the days. In 
addition, the method often limits the time for which the calculation can be made because 
the specific conditions apply only for some periods of time. (Holmberg, Hardin and Koch 
2013) (AEIC Load Research Committee 2009) The suitability of the proxy day method 
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can also be considered insufficient, since there is a broad spectrum of different variables 
affecting the daily consumption and it is thus possible that there is no suitable previous 
day to be used as the basis of baseline estimation. In addition to the challenges of selecting 
a suitable day, this method would still require adjustment for the baseline even if a suita-
ble proxy day can be selected and the data is available. Using the previous day as the 
baseline is a simplified elaboration of the proxy day method. The relative simplicity of 
this method can be seen as an advantage, but the possible major variations in weather or 
other conditions are bound to create inaccuracy when estimating the baseline. 
 
Another method for determining the demand response baseline is regression analysis, 
which uses statistical regression analysis to estimate the baseline based on available data. 
There are various different regression analysis methods based on the type and precision 
of the data, which can be based on individual end-user measurements or pooled consump-
tion statistics. A basic regression analysis method describes a load for each hour of the 
day as a function of the conditions affecting the load such as the cooling degree-day or 
the weekday. Cooling degree day stands for the number of degrees that a day’s average 
temperature is over a specified temperature, which is often the threshold temperature for 
using the air conditioning. (AEIC Load Research Committee 2009) (Goldberg and Agnew 
2013) An example of a basic hourly regression analysis load model calculation is pre-
sented in Equation 2. 
 
𝑳𝒋𝒅𝒉 =  𝜶𝒋𝒉 + 𝜷𝒋𝒉𝑪𝒅 + 𝜺𝒋𝒅𝒉  
 
where Ljdh  is the load of the customer at j hour of day d 
 αjh  is the base coefficient for j hour 
 βjh is the cooling coefficient for j hour 
 Cd  is the cooling degree-days for the day 
 εjdh  is the residual error 
 
Equation 2. An example of basic hourly regression analysis load model for an individual 
user of electricity. (Goldberg and Agnew 2013) 
 
One of the advantages of regression analysis method for baseline calculation is that the 
baseline is calculated for each customer separately, which can act as a basis for further 
analysis of the data and response. Handling each end-user separately also allows for using 
various different baseline methods at the same time, if for example the basic regression 
structure is considered to be unfit for some users. The specific nature of this method also 
enables very weather conditions for very precise areas to be included in the calculation. 
(Goldberg and Agnew 2013) The disadvantage of using individual regression analysis is 
the inherent higher level of estimation error compared to using pooled regression analysis, 
which uses a similar model, but fits a single model across a larger pool of participants 
using a single set of coefficients and variables to describe the average load pattern. This 
pooled method however can be considered unfit as the compensation for demand response 
has to be calculated for each participant separately. Using the pooled model and merely 
dividing the compensation for the sum of the response might lead to a situation, where 
some participants are undercompensated while some other participants are free riding and 
paid too much for their smaller demand reduction. This kind of design error in the forth-
coming demand response markets would be likely to cause distortion and net benefit 
losses as described in Chapter 2.1. For this reason, the pooled regression model should 
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not be considered as a choice for the Nordic markets, especially as there is precise con-
sumption metering available for almost all consumers in these markets. 
 
After introducing the various methods, one should take a look at the suitability of these 
M&V models for the Nordic electricity markets. The amount of demand response pro-
grams is still small, and it should be kept in mind that the experience on baseline calcu-
lation represents only a narrow part of the numerous different types of electricity markets 
and their different features. Does this mean that the lessons mostly learned from the 
American electricity markets are not applicable for the European or Nordic markets? The 
methods described above are a set of mathematical or statistical tools, and should be con-
sidered as such. The accuracy of these tools in estimating the baseline consumption de-
pends on the adjustment of the different variables according to the local market needs. 
This however should not hinder comparing the methods with one another, or their suita-
bility for demand response purposes regardless of where they are to be applied. This view 
is shared also by EnerNOC, which states that failure in matching the variables according 
to the market and customer characteristics can lead to inaccurate results (EnerNOC 2011). 
The pros and cons of the baseline measurement options for Nordic markets are catalogued 
in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. Pros and cons of baseline methodologies for the Nordic markets. An elabora-
tion based on AEIC Load Research Committee (2009). 
 
According to a recent paper by The Smart Energy Demand Coalition, the demand re-
sponse baseline calculation should be made using an agreed and robust methodology and 
that market participants should have a small number of standardized formulas, or ideally 
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one formula, which is applied across whole market area. Emphasis is put on designing a 
method, which is accurate enough to remove free riding. At the same time, it is recognized 
that it might be difficult to apply one standardized model to cover different types of de-
mand response activities on a range of different participants. It is also suggested that the 
design of the standardized measurement and verification method should be based on the 
existing procedures on other markets by the NRA or by the TSO. (SEDC 2015a) 
 
There are multiple studies regarding the measurement and verification of demand re-
sponse on different markets, and the findings in these reports reveal how there are various 
different approaches which are considered as the optimal solution for specifying the base-
line level. Based on the variety of these solutions it would seem that the optimal solution 
is usually market specific for each different market. Hence, regardless of the available 
information from other markets the question of an optimal solution for the Nordic elec-
tricity markets, remains unclear. The optimal outcome should be determined by first tak-
ing a look at the existing markets and their solutions. The efficiency of baseline estimation 
models is relatively easy to determine by using the historical consumption and weather 
data. A baseline estimate can then be calculated for any given day in the past using the 
data previous to this day. The calculated result can then be compared to what actually 
happened on that day. Conducting a large series of computations using different baseline 
calculation methods for the historical consumption data allows us to compare the accu-
racy of each method in different market, weather or other conditions. (Goldberg and 
Agnew 2013) (PJM 2011) (California Energy Commission 2003) After taking a look at 
the varying methods of calculation, the optimal methods and market conditions can be 
compared to the Nordic markets in order to find similarities and differences. These market 
specific features are examined in light of demand response measurement and verification 
to determine, which markets are most likely to have solutions, which would work best for 
the upcoming Nordic demand response system. Following this reasoning, the study will 
now take a look at the baseline estimation methods currently in use, as well as the related 
studies.  
 
Since demand response is a relatively new method, even the first studies regarding meas-
urement and verification or baseline calculation are relatively new. A study conducted by 
California Energy Commission (CEC) was one of the first attempts at determining the 
most accurate baseline using recorded data as the basis for this study. Their research cov-
ered data from several parts of the U.S., and the aim was to assess the accuracy of the 
different baseline methodologies, which are also presented in Figure 19. It was concluded 
that no single approach was able to offer a comprehensive solution for the various load 
characteristics, stating that: “baseline calculation protocols should provide for alternatives 
based on customer load characteristics and operating practices”. Regardless of this, the 
study however revealed some more specific recommendations. Using a rolling ten day 
window with an additive adjustment based on the two hour prior to the demand response 
event was found to be the most practical method. Baseline calculation for highly variable 
loads was found to be challenging as well as the adoption of weather regression due to 
the increased data handling requirements. (California Energy Commission 2003) 
(Goldberg and Agnew 2013) Concerning the increase in computing capacity, it might be 
debatable, whether this applies to the modern electricity markets. On the other hand, the 
CEC report also concluded that using simple averages with weather adjustments produces 
nearly as accurate results. The efficiency of the model should also be among the criteria 
of selecting the baseline method, since overcomplicated models are likely to cause addi-
tional costs or at least increased operational expenses.  
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Similarly to the CEC study, a period averaging method was considered to be the optimal 
also in a more recent study conducted by the Ontario Power Authority (OPA), which 
studied the accuracy of the baseline methods focusing on their own demand response 
program. Differing from the earlier study, the OPA study focused on finding the optimal 
variables for the period averaging calculations. There were in total 48 different combina-
tions of the averaging timeframe and the selected number or high/mid days. Of all these 
analyzed methods, there were six combinations, which were able to produce an average 
error within ± 2 %. These baselines included high 7 of 9 and 10 of 10 hourly baselines 
corrected with either 4 or 6 hour same-day adjustment. The high 10 of 10 baseline how-
ever was considered to be the most accurate option, since this method was able to main-
tain a very low -0,5 % error on average during the most common event periods. It was 
also considered to be most accurate for demand response participants of varying magni-
tude. (Goldberg and Agnew 2013) 
 
The rolling average was also recommended by a PJM study, which ranked the baseline 
estimation tools’ performance as well as the expected administrative costs they bring 
about (PJM 2011). This should be considered as an important viewpoint due to demand 
response applications’ relatively low profit margins caused by the low electricity prices 
(NordPoolSpot 2015b). Determining a reliable and fair baseline estimation method is of 
essence, but it should be kept in mind that the excessive accuracy will result in excessive 
costs, which can outweigh the expected profits. Concerning this, PJM concluded that the 
high 4 of 5 baseline method with additive adjustment was among the most accurate base-
lines without additional operative costs to implement. Some other methods such as the 10 
of 10, or a method used by the ISO-NE were actually found to be more accurate, but the 
increase in accuracy could not justify the additional costs of doing so. It was also found 
that the rolling average method performs well using a subset of time periods such as 10 
of 10, high 5 of 10, high 4 of 5 and middle 4 of 6 with adjustment. These methods however 
were inaccurate in estimating baseline for end users with variable loads. It was suggested 
that end-users with variable load should be segmented separately under a different eval-
uation method or market conducts. (PJM 2011) This is a fundamental discovery regarding 
the Nordic electricity markets. The upcoming demand response market consist of a large 
group of households, as well as industrial consumption units. To promote demand re-
sponse, the market design should create a level playing field for all competitors as sug-
gested by SEDC (2015a). In light of PJM’s discovery this level playing field might actu-
ally mean applying a different set of rules for different kind of participants against the 
intrinsic assumption. Demand response is compensated according to the difference be-
tween metered consumption and the baseline, and if the baseline deviates from the “would 
have been” –consumption level of not participating, the participant is either over- or un-
dercompensated for participation. This possibility of not receiving adequate compensa-
tion can be expected to hinder the participation in DR programs. On the other hand, inac-
curate demand response verification methods could also bring about exploiting of the 
situation by allowing participants to enjoy the compensation without actually even chang-
ing the level of consumption.  
 
The studies above focused largely on the appropriate baseline calculation method and its 
accuracy. A study sponsored by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) spon-
sored an analysis of the baseline estimates focusing more on the baseline adjustment 
methods. The study parameters included universal or optional application of same-day 
adjustments, which was possible in some of the various demand response programs in the 
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study. Universal adjustments mean that the baselines are adjusted for all demand response 
portfolios, while optional adjustment means that the aggregator can elect prior to an event 
whether to apply same-day adjustments or not. The computations were made using mul-
tiple different adjustment caps for the same-day. The adjustment caps refer to the mini-
mum or maximum level of weather or other adjustment compared to the calculated base-
line level. A total of eight adjustment caps were tested including no adjustment, ±20%, 
±30%, ±35%, ±40%, ±50%, -50% to 200% and unlimited adjustments. It was discovered 
that most aggregator programs underestimate the demand reductions. The study con-
cluded that applying any kind of same-day adjustments increases accuracy universally, 
and a large share of the underestimation was caused by the aggregator’s decision not to 
apply the same-day adjustment for all customers in their portfolio. As a result of this, 
universal same-day adjustments were recommended, as they almost always increase the 
accuracy of the estimate. (Freeman, Sullivan & Co. 2011) In light of the CPUC study, the 
case for demand response baseline adjustments is strong, and it would seem illogical to 
allow the aggregator to decide whether or not to apply adjustment for the baseline calcu-
lation. The background of this policy can be expected to be a result of end users with 
stable consumption patterns regardless of other conditions. In consideration of this study 
and the expected inaccuracy, adopting baseline adjustment for all participants seems rea-
sonable. This is also supported by a separate study conducted by the ISO New England 
(ISO-NE 2011) (Goldberg and Agnew 2013). It should also be noted that the imprecision 
of the baselines reported in the CPUC study might be a result of the aggregators’ gaming 
in order to optimize the situation on their behalf (EnerNOC 2011). Gaming refers to a 
situation, where the market players are able to manipulate the demand response system 
in order to pursue additional benefits for themselves. In this case gaming might mean the 
aggregators choosing not to use an adjustment method in order to maintain the baseline 
at a higher level than what it should be. An increase in the baseline level results in a higher 
estimate of the demand response event, which in turn would generate excessive profits 
for the aggregator. This kind of action distorts the markets, leading to an unfavorable 
outcome regarding economics or social welfare as described in Chapter 3.3.2, and should 
be prevented by the demand response market rules regarding the baseline calculation 
methods. 
 
The design of the baseline evaluation method has a major significance in the accuracy, as 
described above. An American regional transmission operator, ISO-New England (ISO-
NE) studied the effects of continuous demand response events on demand response base-
lines (ISO-NE 2011). Most demand response baseline applications are based on mathe-
matical models, which try to evaluate the baseline building on the historical data of the 
previous days. This brings about an issue, when there are continuous subsequent events. 
The models require data from the previous days, but in some cases this data might not be 
available and the accuracy can be expected to decrease as the model is forced to use older 
data. ISO-NE recognized this kind of occurrence in their demand response programs, 
when looking at the day-ahead load response program. The participants were able to offer 
load reduction at such a low price, that the bids cleared every day. These cleared days 
were removed from the baseline calculations according to the local market rules, which 
made the baseline frozen at the level of the first day of clearing of the series. The longer 
the response events were, the more inaccurate the baseline estimate was due to seasonal 
drifting of demand. This “baseline freezing” proved to be problematic, and no optimal 
solution could be discovered for this gaming of the aggregators. The report concluded 
that it is possible to develop policies, which improve the baseline accuracy by limiting 
the days a customer can clear during a particular timeframe, or alternatively using the 
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contemporary meter data for the baseline calculations. If accurate baseline methods ad-
dressing the gaming issue could not be created, then market rules constraining the partic-
ipation of highly variable loads in demand response programs will have to be developed. 
(ISO-NE 2011) While regulating the acceptance of some participation of some actors 
might correct the issue to some measure, this solution seems somewhat inadequate. Lim-
iting the amount of possible demand response bids seems irrational considering the po-
tential gains of the system as a whole. Furthermore, the demand response markets are 
dependent on actors capable of alternating their consumption on a large scale. Preventing 
their acceptance to the markets is likely to cause a large scale loss of capacity on these 
markets. All things considered, flexibility regulation in general should be enabling instead 
of restricting. In addition to this, the demand response structures in Europe and the Nordic 
countries have been suffering from an inadequate number of participants. While gaming 
against the system is a major issue, it might be worthwhile to look at possible more ad-
vanced baseline estimation methods for prolonged timeframes of demand response 
events. Another solution could be to compare the magnitude of the baseline calculation 
gaming and distortions to the total gains of having demand response during these times 
in the first place. If the gains outweigh the disadvantages, some deviations from the opti-
mal baseline might even be considered acceptable. Regardless of what the solution will 
be, it should be based on a thorough examination of the situation and a specific calculation 
of the net effects.  
 
There is also an additional challenge regarding constant demand response events and de-
termining the baseline, for which there apparently at the moment is not a proper solution 
available. As described in Chapter 1, demand response should be considered as shifting 
the consumption to an alternative time period instead of merely lowering or increasing 
the amount of consumption (CEER 2014). What this means in practice is that during the 
so called recovery period after the event, the electricity consumption is higher or lower 
than it would normally be to compensate the change in the load to catch up with the 
normal level of operations. This recovery period is visualized for both increasing (valley 
filling) and reducing the load (peak clipping) in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. The recovery period of demand response events. Adapted from (CEER 2014). 
 
Considering subsequent demand response events and baseline freezing, this would mean 
that even though there were periods of non-event data in between the consequent events, 
the data acquired during these periods might still be too imprecise to represent a normal 
load situation. For this reason, it should not be used as the basis for the baseline calcula-
tions, or at least there might be need for adjustment before using the data. According to 
the theory of recovery period, the error should constantly increase, as the demand re-
sponse period becomes longer because the gap between normal operations is constantly 
growing. However, the idea of increasing error might not apply, if the consequent demand 
response events are conducted by multiple alternating individual end-users operating for 
instance through a  single aggregator. In the case of multiple alternating participants, this 
problem could be solved by examining the level of consumption in the level of end-users 
instead of the aggregator and comparing similar end-user’s consumption patterns. Re-
gardless of this, the problem regarding one participant’s continuous participation and 
baseline calculation remains. Removing the possibility of continuous demand response 
bidding might remove the problem, but at the same time it would limit the number of 
participants as described above. In light of this, additional adjustments merely for these 
cases might be more suitable, but they would add the complexity of the regulation and 
demand more computing capacity adding to the costs. Considering the relatively low level 
of participation, the distortion in baseline calculation during short non-event periods 
should be estimated and weighed against the total benefits of acquiring demand response 
from participants capable of continuous reductions. As with any new procedure, there 
probably will be need for further adjustment after having some actual experience. When 
the prevalence and error of baseline adjustment using data from a short non-event period 
is known, the disadvantages can be scaled and compared, after which the decision be-
tween increased calculation and restraining the bids can be made. 
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Based on the arguments presented above, it would seem that the optimal solution for 
baseline calculation in most of the demand response markets is based on different varia-
tions of the period averaging method. This is also supported by EnerNOC, which has 
stated that High X of Y –baseline calculation with day-of adjustment is the most accurate 
baseline calculation for most applications. Regardless of this, it is also recognized that 
there are typically some system-specific considerations that should be taken into account 
when designing the baseline calculation model. (EnerNOC 2011) These considerations 
can be seen as referring to preventing the demand response participants’ gaming or base-
line freezing issues as well as the required adjustments for local climate conditions. Sim-
ilar recommendations were also given by PJM, as they concluded that the optimal solution 
will depend on the cost structure as well as market-specific considerations (PJM 2011). 
Based on EnerNOC’s and PJM’s statement, as well as the suitability of this method on 
most markets as described above, it is concluded the optimal baseline calculation for de-
mand response in the Nordic electricity markets will be a variation of the period averaging 
method. Determining the market-specific variables for the averaging period and the 
weather and other conditions’ adjustment coefficient however would most likely require 
further analysis. Special attention should also be given to preventing participants from 
gaming the system. The possible restrictions regarding continuous demand response bids 
should be estimated as the commonness of this kind of situations in the Nordic markets 
can be determined and their impact on the total welfare can be estimated. One solution 
for the gaming situation could be to define limits for the maximum days of consequent 
demand response events. Concerning the amount of exact metering there is in the markets, 
the baseline issue could also be solved by comparing the baseline with the actual con-
sumption curve of a similar group of customers, which however are not offering flexibil-
ity. A similar group of end-users would in these cases act as a reference group.  
 
3.2 Applying Demand Response in the Nordic Markets  
After examining the various market models, one should evaluate the implementation of 
the optimal demand response method in the Nordic markets. The chapter assesses how 
the new regulatory model would work, and evaluates the suitability of the models for 
offering demand response to the markets.  
3.2.1 The Suitability of the Demand Response Models in the Nordic 
Electricity Markets  
The various possible market models for demand response are considered in Chapter 3.1.2. 
The analysis focused on reviewing the interactions between the market participants and 
the possible configurations between the market parties as well as the disadvantages these 
schemes might have. Three different possible market models were identified as beneficial 
or suitable for adoption in the markets; the cooperation model, corrected model and the 
contractual model. The previous chapter did not address how easy the implementation of 
these models would be and what kind of changes they would require, which is the core of 
this chapter. The study will now take a look at the models and their suitability in the 
current market configuration. Since the contractual and cooperation model are relatively 
similar, they will be covered simultaneously, while the corrected model stands on its own 
in this analysis. 
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Let´s first take a look at the corrected model, since it differs from the current market 
configuration more than the other solutions. As described, the corrected model is based 
on the aggregator compensating the sourcing costs of the re-routed electricity to the sup-
plier and correcting the incurred balancing error in the balancing calculations for the part 
of activated demand response. Currently, the balancing is handled by the Nordic TSOs 
according to a common balancing model based on two separate balances; the production- 
and the consumption balance as described in Chapter 2.1.4. Each BRP is responsible for 
constantly maintaining a balance between the production/sourcing (production balance) 
and consumption/sales (consumption balance) of electricity. This model based on two 
balances has been in use since 2009, and would require some changes if third party ag-
gregation will be adopted according to the corrected model. (Fingrid 2015) In order for 
the new model to function, the balance of a supplier/BRP has to be corrected by subtract-
ing the electricity reduced by demand response to remove the unfair costs, which would 
otherwise occur to the BRP. What this would mean in practice is that the consumption 
balance calculation should be modified so that it includes an additional subtraction for 
the demand response reduction. This subtraction would be conducted according to the 
actualized demand response which is then verified according to the methods described in 
Chapter 3.1.3. The calculation method including the suggested demand response subtrac-
tion is presented in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. The required change in the balancing model according to the corrected model. 
An elaboration based on (Fingrid 2015)  
 
It is evident that adding a new feature to the established balancing calculation does not 
come without expenses. The required modifications require testing and planning, and the 
additional calculations would likely require additional processing and data storage capac-
ity. The Finnish Energy, an interest group for the companies specialized in production, 
transmit and sales or energy and energy related products has questioned the relevance of 
third party aggregation based on the resulting costs and major changes in the balancing 
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model (The Finnish Demand Response Forum 2015). It is perceivable, how such a major 
change can enhance negative outlooks among the current market participants, regardless 
of the method’s pronouncement as one of the most important solutions regarding energy 
efficiency by the European Commission (Smart Grid Task Force 2015). Whether this is 
simply a case of contrarianism among the current market leaders to protect the benefits, 
or a valid counter argument should not be decided on a hunch or putative figures 
(Krugman 2009). The costs of having a new method at this scale without special 
knowledge of the data systems and its requirements are very hard to estimate without an 
extensive study. It is however reasonable to assume that the costs can be significant. In 
any case however, the focus should not be merely on the the resultant costs, but instead 
on the relation between the scientifically calculated estimated costs and benefits on a 
longer timescale. Due to this reasoning, it is recommended to conduct a study, which 
would examine the costs and benefits of third party aggregation according to the corrected 
model in the Nordic electricity markets. Adopting the corrected model would as well re-
quire reassessing the electricity market law regarding the regulations about balancing re-
sponsibility in the grid. An overview of the required modifications is presented in Chapter 
3.3.3 
 
The reason for having a balancing model is to ensure the power balance between each 
market participant so that we preserve the stability of the network. (Fingrid 2015) 
(Wangesteen 2005) For this reason, we cannot examine the situation merely as correcting 
the unfair costs by using a mathematical calculation. Every demand response event has 
an effect on the grid, which should be taken into account. The electricity network and its 
technical limitations however do not fall under the scope of this study. Regardless of this, 
it has to be mentioned that before applying new demand response models, special atten-
tion should be given to assessing the effects it has on the grid and the possible costs that 
would occur. It should be understood that due to the nature of demand response, the effect 
for the network is likely be a positive change. Demand response has a tendency to remove 
peak pricing and valley filling as described in Chapter 3.1.3., which lowers the network 
requirements. 
 
The contractual and cooperation models can be considered to be significantly easier to 
implement in the current market framework compared to the corrected model. Their func-
tionality is based on the current supplier’s established operations in the markets supple-
mented by the knowledge of an aggregator functioning as a subcontractor or a close part-
ner and being responsible for operating the demand response services for the sup-
plier/BRP. Since there aren’t any new participants in the electricity markets, the require-
ments of operating according to these two models are in fact already in place and there 
should be (The Finnish Government 2013). Compared to the corrected model, the suita-
bility of these two models is very high and the expected costs are minor. Concerning the 
fact that these two models are already in place, it is important to consider why we haven’t 
seen such services offered at a large scale and what could the energy regulators do to 
encourage the adoption of these services. The recommended actions for regulators are 
addressed in Chapter 4.5 
 
The question of the suitability of the suggested market models is largely dependent on the 
balancing model, and as described, the corrected model requires some changes in the 
current system. Consequently, there is currently a common project among the Finnish, 
Swedish and Norwegian TSOs to facilitate a uniform balance settlement; the Nordic Bal-
ance Settlement (NBS). After the project has finished, each BRP operates according to 
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similar rules and service regardless of the country. What this means regarding demand 
response is that for the part of the market areas participating in NBS, there would be need 
to create the rules for aggregated demand response only once compared to the current 
system, where there are minor differences between the countries. (NordREG 2014)  The 
need for making changes in a smaller number of different balancing rules reduces the 
amount of work required, and therefore also mitigates the cost level. The planned lauch 
of the NBS is estimated to be in early 2016. Currently, it seems that the new joint imbal-
ance settlement rules are focusing mostly on handling the harmonization of the various 
balance settlement procedures in the participating countries and addressing the potential 
changes due to demand response seems to be somewhat overlooked or left for further 
revision. (eSett 2015) This is understandable regarding the challenge the TSOs are facing, 
but it could be argued, whether the possibility of adopting third party aggregation rules 
while assessing the common rules would be beneficial. 
 
3.2.2 The Division of Demand Response Profits 
Demand response can provide profits for multiple different parties as described in Chapter 
3.1.1, and there is some question regarding the division of these benefits between the 
parties. To understand this division, the profits are divided into two separate sections; the 
in-market profits and the out of the market profits similarly as in Figure 13.  
 
The out of the market profits are externalities accruing to parties other than the market 
participants which did not choose to incur this benefit, such as the possible network ben-
efit. The magnitude of these externalities are assessed according to models such as the 
framework introduced in Chapter 32 to ensure profitable net benefits as a whole. This 
calculation makes sure that we end up in a profitable situation, and due to the nature of 
these benefits internalizing these benefits is often not beneficial. (Parkin 2014) 
 
The in-market profits however pose more questions regarding the division of income. 
These profits refer to the monetary gains for the market participants; the supplier, the 
aggregator or the consumer, which is providing the flexibility. The proper level of com-
pensation for the supplier is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.1.2, so what is left is the 
division of income between the third party aggregator and the end-user or consumer of 
electricity. (Parkin 2014) 
 
The division of captured surplus depends on the nature of the market participant, depend-
ing on their business orientation and the competitive pressure they are facing. The busi-
ness orientation refers to whether the participant is profit based and thus aiming at max-
imizing its own profit or not. The aggregators as commercial actors aim at increasing their 
overall profit from demand response. At the same time this means that they are willing to 
reduce the end-users’ share of the profits. The sharing of profits is related to the compet-
itive pressure a company is facing. What this means is that the higher the competition is, 
the fairer the distribution with the end-users will be. High competition leads to reducing 
the own profits in order to attract more customers, and while competition is absent, there 
is no need to provide these incentives. (European Commision Think Project 2013) (Smart 
Grid Task Force 2015) 
 
What this means is that the payments for demand response to the flexibility providers 
should depend on the contracts between the participants much like in standard electricity 
contracts. As discussed earlier, demand response is dependent on having multiple actors 
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and competition. If we manage to form a functional demand response market, the end-
user is free to tender the flexibility among the aggregators or suppliers to get the best 
profit. Currently we are facing a situation, where the profit margin for demand response 
is very low and the compensations thus even lower. This can however be expected to 
change depending on the electricity prices, level of renewable generation and other 
changes in the markets. It should be also understood that when operated properly, demand 
response can be unnoticeable for the end-user of energy. The changes in room tempera-
tures for instance after switching the heating off are so slow, that any short flexibility bids 
will go unnoticed (Ruotsalainen 2008). If there is no perceived disadvantage, even minor 
compensations can be considered to be worthwhile. 
 
3.3 Energy Regulation and Demand Response 
Energy plays a major part in a modern society, which is partly the reason for having such 
comprehensive rules and regulations in the markets. This chapter takes a look at the rea-
sons for regulating any economical schemes, and the preconditions for designing fair new 
demand response regulations for the electricity markets. The ambitions of regulation in 
general, and the recommendations for demand response serve as the fundamental rules, 
according to which each of the recommendations given in this study have to apply. After 
taking a look at the preconditions for creating new regulation, the chapter continues by 
analyzing the expected and observed market distortions or failures related to introducing 
demand response as a new resource to the existing electricity markets. These deviations 
are the fundamental reason for having regulative guidance in the electricity markets. After 
introducing the market distortions, a look is taken at the specific changes, which are re-
quired to create functional and balanced new markets. 
3.3.1 The Aim of Electricity Market Regulation and Designing Unbi-
ased Rules for Demand Response 
The Nordic electricity markets are a liberalized area as addressed in Chapter 2.1.3. Re-
gardless of the markets being open, there is still need for legislative guidelines and regu-
lations. Regulation in general refers to the government or a governmental body applying 
laws, rules or orders to regulate economic interactions in order to reach social or economic 
objectives. The purpose of regulation is to protect the public from the negative conse-
quences of imperfect competition or to eliminate a company from abusing market domi-
nance. (Partanen 2010) There are numerous different market-related features typically 
causing market failures, which justify the need for regulation, such as natural monopolies, 
information asymmetry or protection of infant industries. (Kraus 2005) Regulation in the 
case of electricity markets should thus be considered as a necessary tool for correcting 
the errors, which are quintessential in such schemes. The aim of regulation is to ensure 
proper functionality of the market system, which in the end is also the ultimate goal of 
this study. Designing proper regulative framework for demand response in the Nordic 
electricity markets can however be a challenging task. The markets consist of numerous 
different parties, each having their own interests as described in Chapter 2.1.4. The up-
coming regulation should at the same time ensure the adoption of demand response at a 
level playing field compared to other sources of energy, without at the same time discrim-
inating any of the current actors. As described in Chapter 2.1.3, the Nordic electricity 
markets have been operating since the 1990’s, and the current market operating policy is 
the result of several consequent reforms. It has been recognized that during market re-
forms, following the basic emerged blueprint is likely to lead to well-functioning markets. 
Any major deviation from this path is expected to lead to unintended consequences, which 
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in turn would create new challenges. In addition to this, any electricity market reform has 
proven to be challenging and complex, regardless of possible previous experiences and 
lessons learned. (Kraus 2005) (P. Joskow 2006) 
 
According to the reasoning above, it is clear that the required demand response reform in 
the electricity markets should be designed as a part of the current market operating prin-
ciples. This however does not clarify the actual goals of these new policies. As discussed 
in Chapters 1.2 and 2.1.2, demand response is an important and valuable method for in-
creasing energy efficiency and solving balancing issues. The energy regulators should 
aim at creating policies, which facilitate the efficient take-up of demand response in order 
to achieve these benefits. The European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regula-
tors (ACER) conducted a study regarding the potential and current state of demand re-
sponse in the European Union (ACER 2014). Based on this study, several regulatory prin-
ciples are recommended in order to ensure efficient adoption of demand response. Let’s 
now take a look at each of these principles individually, and assess their possible execu-
tion in the Nordic markets. These principles, and the fact that the solution should be based 
on the existing market design serve as the basis for creating the new regulatory scheme, 
and each change should be in line with both of these. 
 
 Market design should be tailored to take account of the demand flexibility, which 
is able to provide value. It is unlikely that demand response will be provided in 
useful quantities, or arise naturally by itself, if there are no specific market ar-
rangements, which support this kind of response. (ACER 2014) In practice this 
means that from market perspective there would be no difference between mega-
watts produced by increased production or reduced consumption. From the regu-
latory perspective, this recommendation means that there should be a standardized 
method for offering demand response products to the markets.  
 
 The demand response participant should be properly compensated for the services 
provided to the market. Unless demand response is given a similar opportunity to 
earn fair remuneration for the provided services, it is unlikely that it will be pro-
vided at a sufficient level. (ACER 2014) This does not however mean that demand 
response should be incentivized, or overcompensated. The energy resources 
should be able to compete on the market on an equal basis and the compensation 
level should be determined by demand and supply. A more thorough analysis of 
the price formation can be found in Chapter 3.1.1.  
 
 The compensation for demand response demands a plausible method for verifying 
the amount of flexibility delivered. Without proper measurement and verification 
methods, there can be opportunities for taking advantage of the system abusively, 
and unfair compensation might be paid for fabricated flexibility. (ACER 2014) 
The challenge is in finding a common method to be adopted in the whole market 
area among all the participants. The optimal methods for demand response verifi-
cation in the Nordic markets are studied and explained extensively in Chapter 0.  
 
 Electricity users should be assisted in realizing that they have the opportunity to 
participate in the demand flexibility markets, and make actual savings for doing 
so. Domestic electricity users rarely engage with electricity markets and also in-
frequently make decisions, which would change their patterns of energy usage. 
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(ACER 2014) Informing about demand response is an important factor of achiev-
ing functional demand response markets, and in line with the Finnish national 
regulatory authority’s strategy statement (Energiavirasto 2012). The most effec-
tive means of encouraging demand response by communication would likely be 
by creating a uniform communicating strategy between all the market participants. 
In the case of Nordic markets, this could be easily achieved by cooperating in a 
project as a part of the active Nordic energy regulator’s organization, NordREG. 
There is currently also an internet portal encouraging domestic customers to ten-
der their electricity contracts (Energiavirasto 2015). Creating a similar service list-
ing the purchase bids for demand response would clarify the financial gains and 
likely encourage more participants to offer demand reduction (SEDC 2015a). Cur-
rently, the price level of electricity in the Nordic markets is considerably low 
(NordPoolSpot 2015a). The price level can however be expected to change, as the 
European grid becomes more integrated and more countries bid for the Norwegian 
hydro power (IEEE Spectrum 2015). A higher electricity price will lead to in-
creased savings for participating in demand response programs, but setting up the 
required framework and informing the potential participants should be done well 
beforehand.  
 
 An unconflicted party should be in control of constructing the market model and 
regulations affecting demand flexibility. There are multiple market participants, 
which earn income by providing other sources of flexibility and thus are conflicted 
from a neutral approach, since it potentially is contradictory to their interests. 
(ACER 2014) For each member country, there is a national regulatory authority 
in charge of the enforcement of legislation as well as the construction of these 
market models in cooperation with each other in NordREG. Fulfilling this recom-
mendation should hence come naturally in the Nordic electricity markets. There 
might however be some conflicting views or contradictory measures for enforcing 
demand response legislation regardless of the Nordic countries’ mutual under-
standing. These markets consist of both EU non-member and member countries, 
which operate under the European Commission’s ordinances.  
 
 Demand flexibility resources should be treated equally compared to other sources 
of flexibility. The value of flexibility is avoiding investement in other sources of 
capacity, and the full useful extent cannot be delivered unless it is equally treated. 
(ACER 2014) 
 
 If necessary, system standards should be revised to be more consistent with a mar-
ket where there are multiple sources of flexibility. The standards are typically de-
signed in an era, without many sources of flexibility, which can result in disqual-
ifying some efficient resources. (ACER 2014)  
 
Regardless of the ultimate regulatory market design to adopt demand response resources’ 
participation in the markets, it should be understood that regulation can by no means reach 
an ultimate optimal point, where it can be considered to apply the best solution in the 
changing environment. Instead, the whole regulatory scheme consisting of the regulator, 
companies, customers and legislators interact with each other by feedback mechanisms, 
which in turn results in a further change in the regulative structure. (Partanen 2010) What 
this means regarding demand response is that the aim is to design an optimal model, and 
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possible further changes should be considered to be an acceptable and required modifica-
tions resulting from a change in the whole market. 
 
3.3.2 Market Failures and Distortions 
Regardless of the multiple benefits of demand response, there are some indications of 
possible negative effects of applying demand response programs. The design of the reg-
ulatory framework should be applied to minimize or remove the negative effects when 
necessary. Let’s now take a look at these distortions and in the markets created by ena-
bling flexibility services. 
 
One of the potential market distortions relate to the actual benefits of having demand 
response systems operating in the markets. According to a Danish study analyzing de-
mand response based on microeconomic theory, there is a risk of actually losing social 
welfare by introducing demand response in the market system. This is based on an idea, 
that there is a generator, which has excessive market power, and introducing demand 
response would increase this power to operate in his own interest. The researchers admit 
to the fact that the results are still preliminary and indicative. However, if the arguments 
hold true, whether introducing demand response creates a welfare gain or loss would de-
pend on the amount of companies participating. According to the study, if two companies 
are competing, welfare could be increased by introducing demand response. While having 
three or more companies, the result would be opposite. (Andersen 2006) There are similar 
arguments regarding the net benefits of demand response in Chapter 3.1.1, and it would 
seem that instead of viewing the technology as a comprehensive solution for all the mar-
ket problems, demand response should instead be addressed as a tool, which might not be 
suitable for all solutions. The advantages of this technology are always sector-specific 
depending on the local market players and electricity production facilities. This is likely 
to call for an analysis of the impacts as a whole before considering the introduction of 
these systems on a wider scale. 
 
There is also some dispute to whether the effect of having demand response has a negative 
environmental effect. It is argued, that under the current regulatory environment, demand 
response profits are disproportional with the benefits, and more attention should be paid 
to the levels of CO2 emissions in these schemes. The emissions’ impact depends on the 
generation mix of the market. If the base load plant has intrinsically higher emissions than 
the peak power plant in use, activating demand response can increase the total emissions. 
(Van Horn and Gross 2013) It is clear that the demand response programs should take 
into account the effect on CO2 emissions and ensure that the end results are in line with 
the overall goals of having demand response in the first place as defined in Chapter 1.2.  
 
The issues described above are in fact recognized also by the European regulators, and 
they publicly state that there are market cases, in which the profitability of demand re-
sponse is compromised. According to ACER’s estimate, the disadvantages are rather the 
result of an already compromised market environment. Due to these market faults, adding 
additional market configuration might further increase his problem if not correctly ad-
dressed. It is however noted, that the risk of perverse outcomes should by itself be reduced 
the more liberalized, integrated and competed the markets are. (ACER 2014)   
 
In addition to the previous potential net benefit losses, demand response can potentially 
have a major negative effect on the economy of power systems. An example of this is the 
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arbitrage created in capacity auctions, which are in use in the PJM markets. Every three 
years, an auction is held in order to secure the reliability of the system. Each power pro-
ducer can bid in the auction for a plant to be included in the scheme. After an accepted 
bid, the plant is required to be able to deliver electricity if requested. Should this be for 
some reason impossible for the actor, they have to purchase replacement capacity in an 
incremental auction from the other producers. Demand response is allowed to bid in the 
capacity auction as if it were traditional supply of electricity. The demand response bids 
are typically substantially lower, since they have lower costs due to the nature of the 
technology and low need for technology. As a result, the traditional energy producers are 
pushed out of the market. The arbitrage is created, when the incremental auction is held. 
The prices in this second auction are typically lower than in the first auction. This has led 
to a situation, where the demand response providers first bid for a high price, then pur-
chase the replacement capacity from the second auction pocketing the difference. (James 
2013) It is clear, that operating based on a market arbitrage is likely to be prevented in 
the long run, which is why this kind of actions are most likely hindering the adoption of 
demand response schemes. There are no such capacity mechanisms currently in the Nor-
dic electricity markets, apart from the similarities between the power reserves, which are 
used only for situations, when the electricity markets are unable to cover the demand. 
(Energiavirasto 2015) (The Finnish Government 2011) (NordREG 2009) It should how-
ever be noted that similar exploitation can occur, if demand response resources are con-
sidered by the same precepts as generation. What this means, is that the participation rules 
for flexibility should be revised before introducing it to a reserve or a market segment. 
Special attention should also be given to the verification and measurement of these re-
sources. It should also be noted that verifying demand response according to the methods 
introduced in Chapter 3.1.3, and obliging the implementation according to the flexibility 
bids is likely to reduce this problem by forcing the actors to create the agreed capacity by 
reducing demand instead of sourcing additional energy. This would also remove the ar-
bitrage, and thus correct the market operations.   
 
This problem regarding a market based arbitrage is in fact a result of treating demand-
side resources on an equal basis with supply-side resources, which is an understandable, 
but fallacious conclusion. The design of the electricity markets was designed to accom-
modate supply-side resources and demand response differs from these resources as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3.1.1. This further enhances the need of clarifying the current market 
conduct rules and recognizing the required changes.  The gaming issue discussed in Chap-
ter 3.1.3 and the welfare losses related to it are closely linked to the risk of market arbi-
trage and fall under the category of market distortions or failures. Gaming in this case 
refers to a market participant exploiting the current regulations. It is a result of inadequate 
market conduct rules, which then leads to an undesirable outcome as the individual play-
ers operations aiming at maximizing their profits has in fact an opposite reaction in the 
total benefits.  
 
Gaming and the other disadvantages described in this chapter should be considered as 
regulatory challenges, which need to be solved. It should be kept in mind, that there are 
deficiencies in every market. All of the European stock exchange markets have to be 
constantly monitored and market conduct rule breaches are often observed. The situation 
is the same regarding flexibility, but naturally introducing a completely new scheme is 
bound to create some unexpected issues. The first steps in avoiding the problems as made 
clear in this study are understanding the fundamental difference between supply increase 
and demand-side flexibility, and determining the required market conduct rule changes 
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accordingly. The possible new distortions arising during the introduction of demand re-
sponse schemes should be considered as natural occurrences in the development of a new 
market scheme and left to be resolved in the  
 
3.3.3 Required Modifications in the Electricity Markets 
The study examined the main challenges of applying demand response schemes in elec-
tricity markets in Chapter 3.1. This research however considers the challenges from a 
wider perspective. The issues are viewed and solved by considering them as separate the-
oretical challenges, which in real life are actually derived from regulatory and legislative 
stipulations. This chapter takes a look at the prequisites for actually making the required 
changes. The aim is at recognizing the general deficiencies in current market rules, which 
would be in need of revising in order to accomplish the suggested changes investigated 
in this study. 
 
Traditionally the day-ahead market has been the center of energy markets. The common 
operation practice in the day-ahead energy market is such that the market operator re-
ceives offers from generating units to provide energy, which are combined with the pur-
chase bids forming the price level. Traditionally the demand of electricity has been con-
sidered to be relatively passive, and the electricity production has to be scheduled to fol-
low the varying demand. (Parvania, Demand Response Participation in Wholesale Energy 
Markets 2012) As we are facing more flexibility in the demand-side as well as improve-
ment in the metering technology, there is a need to revise the market rules and structures 
to allow the new resources to operate.  
 
The current market legislation does not take into account third party aggregators’ demand 
response and currently the flexibility offers are accepted only by the supplier. By exam-
ining the policies, it becomes evident that the legislation regarding balancing has to be 
revised, if third party aggregators are to be allowed operation in the markets. (The Finnish 
Government 2013) Currently the situation however is such that the changes in the market 
rules should be conducted on the European level according to the procedures governed 
by the Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) (European 
Commission 2015). In addition, there is an ongoing harmonization of the Finnish, Swe-
dish and Norwegian balance settlement, Nordic Balance Settlement, according to which 
the potential balancing methods should be agreed on. (eSett 2015) (NordREG 2009). The 
Network Code on Electricity Balancing (NCEB) is estimated to enter into force during 
2016, which may restrict the possibilities of having separate Nordic initiatives regarding 
balancing (ACER 2015).  
 
In addition to the legislative and regulative policies, changes would have to be made to 
the NordPool market conduct rules to enable third party aggregators’ participation in the 
market operations correspondingly. (NordPoolSpot 2015c) 
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4 Conclusions  
Demand response is a compendious resource, which will most probably have a central 
role in the future endeavours for a more efficient and modern smart grid structures. As 
described in Chapter 1.3, the approach for clarifying the optimal end result in this com-
plex system with intertwined and possibly competing participants is based on analysing 
smaller segments. The optimal solution is then discovered by combining these partial 
solutions, provided that they are not exclusive from one another. It is however important 
to understand that reaching a flawless solution in such a complicated setting is arguably 
challenging or even impossible. Instead, the aim should be at discovering the optimal 
solution, which improves the current market setting. In this case the optimal solution re-
fers to the maximum total benefit to the system as a whole, which also has acted as the 
main rationale in analysing each separate partial solution. 
 
This chapter consists of a summary and conclusions of the findings regarding the thesis 
aims and research questions. Due to the significance of the study as a guideline for the 
financier, Energiavirasto, the study concludes by presenting the individual recommenda-
tions for actions to be taken by the regulators regarding demand response. 
 
4.1 The Value of Flexibility 
In order to operate a functional demand response scheme as a part of the electricity mar-
kets in a beneficial way, there has to be a solid understanding of the value of the utility. 
The price should reflect the value it can generate to its purchasers, or otherwise there is a 
risk of distorting the markets and ending up in a counterproductive situation regarding 
the net benefits. As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1., there has been an active debate concern-
ing the true value of demand response and whether there is need to regulate the price 
level. 
 
Due to the pioneer role of the North-American demand response markets, the most ad-
vanced methods stem from this origin. According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), demand response resources should be compensated at the full locational 
market price, which is a price level used in the nodal pricing system. This is not com-
pletely analogous with the Nordic electricity market structure, but the procedure to esti-
mate the economic effects was found to be adaptable also in this market. What the 
FERC’s decision means in practice is that we should accept the price determined on the 
markets for this resource without any additional regulative adjustments. Statements sup-
porting this view have also been given by the European Commission. 
 
The main argument to regulate the price level of demand response instead of accepting 
the market price was found to be based on an idea that paying the full market price results 
in excessive compensation for the flexibility and net benefit losses. This is an economic 
argument based on the idea that paying the full market price for demand response re-
sources while the customers at the same time avoid paying the marginal energy rates is 
producing a compensation for the resource which actually exceeds the benefits. This over-
compensation would then lead to excessive amounts of demand response and a sub-opti-
mal market situation. Following this logic, the proponents of this view suggest correcting 
the price by subtracting the cost of generation from the price set in the markets. The study 
concluded that such regulatory alterations in the market price are likely to impede the 
adoption of demand response, which can be considered difficult to operate in a profitable 
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manner with the current price levels. The argument was also found to be somewhat in 
dichotomy with the idea of accepting demand response as an equal resource as defined 
by the European Commission.  
 
Even though the arguments for subtracting the retail tariff from the market price were 
found to be erroneous, it was discovered that there might be some veritability in the con-
viction. The reason for having demand response programs was found to be a result of the 
retail tariff structures intervening with the market, which results in the inadequacy of the 
demand curve to accurately represent the real demand. This could be avoided by having 
real-time pricing for all customers, but due to the market setting and customers’ wishes it 
is seems impossible to achieve. What this means is that the markets have an inherent 
structure creating some inefficiency. It was discovered that even some of the opponents 
of the retail rate subtraction for market price admit the formal correctness of paying less 
than market price for demand response. Regardless of this, it was however explained that 
there is always a wide range of inefficiencies in the market, and the subtraction would 
result in a suboptimal situation from a wider perspective. This view is also shared by the 
European regulators. It was discovered, accepting the full market price is likely the most 
suitable for the Nordic electricity markets concerning the adoption of demand resources. 
The study however concluded that the issue is political and still requires further analysis. 
 
In addition to the pricing, the research clarified that one of the central attributes regarding 
demand response valuation was the assessment of its net benefits as a whole. What this 
means is that there is a need for assessing the total effect the flexibility has and then 
considering the possible restrainment of the detrimental offers from taking place. There 
are such measures in use at the moment, but the focus of these existing methods was 
however found to be likely too narrow and focusing only on a small part of the partici-
pants. Regarding the Nordic markets the optimal solution was presumed to be based on 
assessing the full financial value of demand response.  
 
In addition to the methods currently in use, the study discovered a framework for com-
prehensive demand response evaluation, which could be used as a template in designing 
the necessary net benefits evaluation. This framework is based on two different segments 
focusing separately on the participants in the demand response market, and participants 
which are not in direct involvement in the market but can gain profits from the activities. 
The framework assesses these two segments using computational modelling based on 
market economics and cost/benefit analysis, and estimates the total social surplus accord-
ingly. The input data required for these calculations is obtained from real electricity mar-
kets, which can be considered to be readily available. After this calculation, a decision is 
made to whether to dispatch the cleared demand response or not. This decision is made 
depending on its total effect, rejecting any flexibility action, which would result in a neg-
ative social surplus. 
 
Due to the adaptability of the model and its comprehensive extent, it was discovered that 
it is likely to provide an appropriate basis for creating a net benefits test model for the 
Nordic electricity markets. For this reason it is recommended to be used in the develop-
ment of the demand response valuation schemes. 
 
It was however recognized that applying new structures for evaluating the net effect of 
demand response bids will likely cause expenses and face opposition, depending largely 
on the division of expenses among the market participants. It should thus be emphasized 
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that demand response is and will be an increasingly important resource. In addition, the 
adoption of flexibility has been clearly concluded in the European Commission. Making 
any kind of major changes in the existing market configuration is bound to create ex-
penses, and the situation should be considered on a longer timescale; there is need for 
making the changes and having the net benefit valuation computations is likely essential 
in reaching an optimal outcome. Otherwise we face the risk of implementing demand 
response without actually gaining all the potential advantages.  
 
4.2 Market Model for Demand Response in the Nordic Electricity 
Markets 
The question of an optimal market model is discussed at length in Chapter 3.1.2, where 
the main challenge reflects the question of discovering a pattern or patterns, according to 
which the potential demand response resources could be brought to the market in the most 
undisruptive manner. The study recognized the most challenging aspects to be the possi-
ble overlapping responsibilities regarding network balancing and hence the fallaciously 
directed costs to the BRP, encouraging the adoption of new flexibility services and the 
role of separate third party aggregation.  
 
With regards to market economics and according to the findings, it seems plausible that 
the optimal solution for the basic layout of the market participants – the market model – 
consists of multiple separate models, which would enable the participation of all demand 
response resources. The possible market configurations were mapped, and three of them 
were identified to be most suitable regarding the aspirations of demand response regard-
ing energy savings and market efficiency. Each of the market participants would be able 
to operate their organization according to one of these three policies in the markets and 
thus the recommendation for the optimal model is the combination of the following op-
erating policies. This is also in line with creating a level playing field for possible new 
entrants.  
 
The three suggested models fall under two different categories; offering demand response 
via the current supplier/BRP or offering demand response services using a separate third 
party aggregator. The selected models; cooperation-, contractual- and corrected model 
are each somewhat different from each other and offer a solution for bringing a variety of 
different demand response resources to the markets, which is found to be essential. The 
cooperation model is largely based on the current market structure, where the supplier 
simply includes the demand response services to its service portfolio, whether they create 
the flexibility themselves or by purchasing flexibility services from an affiliate. Accord-
ing to the findings, this model is the easiest to apply, but consequently also limits the 
participation of possible new entrants in the markets. The contractual model is a variation 
of the cooperation model, in which the aggregator is in liaison as a separate party author-
ized by a contract, which defines the procedures between the two parties. The difference 
now is that the aggregator is a separate third party with its own responsibilities regarding 
balancing. The third model, the corrected model, enables a separate third party aggregator 
to operate without the consent of the current supplier of the flexibility providing customer. 
This is based on the idea that an aggregator could enable a better and more profitable use 
for the available electricity. Introducing such measures however requires assessing the 
proper level of compensation to cover the actualized sourcing costs for the supplier/BRP, 
but no more than that. While the model has been contested by the current suppliers’ pro-
ponents as described earlier, it is very important to enable the participation of new entrant 
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independent aggregators to achieve the benefits. This view has ample support among the 
unbiased high-level stakeholders. According to the findings, enabling third party aggre-
gation is also likely to have an inherent and encouraging effect regarding flexibility ser-
vices. The possibility of an aggregator to capture part of the suppliers’ sales forces the 
current operators to offer such services themselves. By removing this entry barrier, the 
successful service provider in the long run will be decided based on the efficiency of the 
operation instead of the established position just as it should be according to market eco-
nomics. While doing so we will also reach a more optimal outcome regarding total bene-
fit. There is also an ongoing political discussion regarding the rationale for the payments 
for the energy to the supplier paid by the aggregator, and its effects on the amount of 
offered demand response. Special attention should be given to estimating the net effects 
in each of these scenarios before making the decision. 
 
Regardless of the evident market benefits, it is found to be important to assess the mag-
nitude of changes required in order to apply a new structure in the markets. Operating 
according to the models including a separate aggregator (contractual or corrected model) 
means that there is actually a need to divide the balancing responsibility for two separate 
parties. Otherwise the balancing error created by the aggregator activating would bring 
about an unfair cost, for which the BRP would be liable. Dividing a balancing responsi-
bility is very different from the current balancing model, and correcting the situation 
would require including some additional calculations. This correction would mean in 
practice subtracting the amount of activated demand response from BRP’s balance to re-
move the accountability for the part of aggregated flexibility. Based on the findings and 
the major potential of third party aggregation, it seems to be very important to bring this 
third party resource to the markets. There are multiple studies regarding the benefits of 
aggregated demand response. It is however found to be important to conduct a quantita-
tive study estimating the benefits and expenses of changing the balancing model and al-
lowing third party aggregation especially in the Nordic Electricity markets. 
 
4.3 Measuring Flexibility 
In order to successfully operate a demand response market, there has to be a specific and 
reliable method for verifying that a reduction in the energy usage has actually been real-
ized. The study shows, that the significance of the verification and measurement of de-
mand response are very central concerning the adoption of flexibility, since the financial 
transactions would be based on the amounts of electricity measured and verified by the 
standardized method. According to the observations in the study, reliable and transparent 
measurement also results in lower risk for the demand response operators as well as en-
hances the market participation of this resource. 
 
The amount of demand response is defined as the difference between the observed load 
and the load that would have occurred otherwise without the flexibility, calculated over 
the specific time period of the demand response event. This brings about the issue that 
the level of consumption during normal operations without flexibility is by definition un-
available. The solution for this was found to be creating a baseline level of consumption 
using mathematical, historical or statistical methods. The baseline is an estimate of the 
consumption that would have occurred without demand response, which is then used as 
a basis for calculation.  
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The research discovered several different methods for determining the baseline. The most 
suitable method for assessing demand response was found to be using a rolling average 
method, which would be adjusted by a High X of Y method. This method determines the 
number of rolling days out of which the number of Y highest values will be used for the 
calculation. Specifying the optimal numbers to be used in the Nordic markets depends on 
the market specific factors, which can be discovered by statistical analysis of the different 
options using historical data. The most suitable rolling average baseline calculation meth-
ods were able to produce an average error of ± 2 %. During the most common event 
periods, an average error of ± 0,5 % could be reached.  
 
It was also concluded that additional same-day adjustments such as adjusting the calcu-
lation according to the consumption two hours before the event always increase the accu-
racy of the calculation. These additional adjustments are recommendable, but it should 
be understood that additional calculation increases the complexity and thus also the costs 
of operating these measurement services in the demand response markets, which currently 
operate under a low profit margin. 
 
It was discovered that there is a risk of demand response providers to take advantage of 
the system by exploiting the measurement methods based on a rolling average. This gam-
ing of the system can potentially result in the baseline freezing at a certain level if the 
demand response bids are activated for a specific timeframe in consequent days. This 
could be prevented by designing regulatory measures such as limiting the amount of con-
sequent bids or using reference groups to determine the baseline in these cases. Before 
applying restrictions for continuous demand response bids, their prevalence should how-
ever be estimated. Special attention should also be given to calculating the effects regard-
ing total welfare.  
 
4.4 Further Research and the Significance of this Study 
It has become evident that demand response is a more complicated subject than one might 
think at a first glance. The focus of this study is merely on the wholesale electricity mar-
kets, but the same resource has significant resources for instance also in congestion man-
agement, other network uses as well as frequency or supply reserves. Due to the fact that 
demand response is still underutilized and relatively new in the markets, there is need for 
conducting similar studies regarding the adoption of demand response in other uses of 
this technology as well. 
 
Concerning the scope of this study, further studies would be required especially concern-
ing the Nordic markets. As there is a relatively large coverage of smart metering currently 
available, demand response should be more easily applied than in most of the other mar-
kets. This and the developed liberalized markets could enable the Nordics to adopt the 
role of a pioneer. There are currently multiple studies regarding the benefits of applying 
demand response. Contradictory to the view of the Nordic market as a suitable market for 
early adoption of these resources, most of these studies are focusing on individual Central 
European countries or USA. It would seem that conducting a quantitative study focusing 
on the Nordic potential would be needed.  
 
Many of the studies regarding the benefits of demand response are focusing merely on 
the price savings. Since the benefits however stem from multiple different sources, it 
would be more reasonable to try to estimate the full benefits on each specific market. For 
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instance what seems to be missing is a study estimating the difference in expenses using 
scenarios where demand is applied and not. This study could be based on the expected 
future investments in generation or network, which could be avoided by introducing de-
mand response. As it is, the profit marginal for demand response is low. This is however 
subject to change depending on the electricity prices and flexible production capacity 
available, and we are currently facing a shift towards a higher penetration of renewable 
production. In addition, home automation is taking major leaps forward and the future 
role of electric vehicles in electricity networks remains unclear. In addition, the develop-
ment of internet of things and the development of smart grid systems are bound to miti-
gate the expenses of applying the technologies demand response necessitates. It would 
seem to be lucrative to assess the significance of flexibility in different expected future 
market settings regarding the price of electricity and the rate of adoption of the mentioned 
technologies. The required investments in modifying the current market model might 
seem expensive at present time, but the outlook might differ concerning the forthcoming 
changes. 
 
It should be understood that demand response is a resource, which has decreasing mar-
ginal benefits depending on the amount of flexibility provided. What this means is that 
the first participants to implement the technology have larger benefits than the rest. The 
changing benefits and a large number of data makes the number of computations very 
high, which is why most of the studies have taken a significantly simplified approach 
resulting in more inaccurate results. There is currently only one single and very recent 
study, which encompasses this by examining the value of shifting demand as a response 
to prices (Corbishley 2015). Further more specific studies would be required.  
 
Regarding the adoption of demand response resources, it should be understood that en-
ergy production is a very political subject. As the demand response services can poten-
tially displace some major industrial operators’ facilities, it is likely that the subject will 
bring about political debate. It should be thus understood that the adoption of these new 
resources – even profitable ones – is not based completely on the computational benefits, 
but there might be more complex challenges regarding protectionism, politics or conflicts 
of interest that need to be resolved. 
  
All in all, demand response should be considered as a utility suitable for some situations 
instead of a comprehensive solution for market inefficiencies. This highlights the im-
portance of assessing the overall effects before applying any changes in the current mar-
ket structure. The research in this study clarified the mode of operation, according to 
which the markets should be organized to enable efficient adoption of this resource in the 
Nordic electricity markets. In addition to quantifying the potential, it is recommended to 
conduct pilot projects which turn these measures into tangible experiences, which in turn 
are likely to provide further understanding of the subject. This thesis should be viewed as 
a preliminary study on defining the basic principles of operating a market incorporating 
demand response, based on which further research on the market structures can then be 
elaborated. There is uncertainty regarding the future of the markets, and hence also on the 
role of flexibility. Regardless of this, it is evident that demand response has significant 
potential and the work to unleash these resources continues. 
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4.5 Recommendations for the Nordic Energy Regulators regar-
ding the Implementation of Demand Response Resources 
According to the request by the financier of this research, the study concludes by present-
ing the recommendations for actions based on the findings. This list of recommendations 
applies to the scope of the study as described in Chapter 1.4, disclosing the most benefi-
cial actions and operation modes for efficient adoption of demand response resources in 
the Nordic electricity markets as well as the requisite changes in the policies.  
 
I. Assess the functionality of the framework for estimating the net 
effects of a demand response bid  
The study proposed a framework for estimating the net effects of each demand 
response bid. The suitability and possible reformations for the model regarding 
the Nordic markets should be assessed. Special attention should also be put on 
assessing the costs and level of constant work required in using the model to en-
sure that establishing such a scheme would actually produce a beneficial outcome.  
II. Revise the policies to adopt third party resources to participate in 
the electricity markets 
The current market conduct rules and policies support only demand response pro-
vided by the suppliers. It was discovered that allowing third party aggregated de-
mand response providers is necessary to obtain the full benefits of the scheme. 
For this reason, the regulations should be redesigned to support also this resource. 
This would require interaction between the legislators, regulators as well as all the 
market participants in making the needed alterations in the laws and power ex-
change rules. 
III. Evaluate the cost of making the required changes (balancing, pol-
icy) 
The participation of third party aggregation in the electricity market is recognized 
as a required resource and there are some major changes needed in order to enable 
it. On the long run it would seem worthwhile to make these changes. On a shorter 
timescale however, the cost of these changes should be assessed. In addition to 
this, special attention should be given to the division of these expenses in a justi-
fied manner. 
IV. Assess the requirements and develop the standardized contracts 
between the market participants  
The reason for having standardized contracts is to ensure that all the required fac-
tors have been taken into account before starting to operate the new scheme. These 
standards also play a major part in lowering the barriers of entry to the markets. 
The standardized processes can be considered to be important for all demand re-
sponse models, but especially for the third party aggregation. The aggregator has 
to be able to operate independently but in some kind of a cooperation with the 
supplier/BRP, which is potentially at the same time its competitor. The regulators 
define the standardized contracts to enable smooth operation of the market. In 
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short, the standardized contracts could consist of defining the volumes, compen-
sation, data flows as well as a method for resolving any upcoming issues between 
the participants. 
V. Develop a method for specifying an accurate level of compensation 
to cover the sourcing costs for the supplier / BRP for third party 
aggregation 
These costs should reflect the full sourcing cost as closely as possible covering 
the cost of purchasing the electricity for the part that was dispatched as demand 
response and “resold” by the aggregator.  
VI. Redesign the balancing model to support third party aggregation 
In order to enable third party aggregation, there has to be a method to correct the 
balancing error that would otherwise be created to the supplier/BRP. In practice, 
this means that the aggregator assumes the balancing for the part of demand re-
sponse and any other balancing error would be the responsibility of the supplier 
such as it currently is. 
VII. Conduct a simulation study assessing the quantitative potential of 
third party aggregation in the Nordic electricity markets 
While the role of independent aggregators in demand response is recognized, it 
would seem to be necessary to conduct a further cost/benefit study regarding the 
situation. The study would simulate the situation at various electricity price and 
demand variables obtained from the real Nordic electricity markets. The results of 
this study would act as a guideline before making the decision of actually applying 
the compensation model. The aim would be to estimate the expected benefits, 
which could then be compared to the expenses created in applying the required 
changes in balancing or policies to enable third party aggregation. 
VIII. Investigate the market specific variables to be used in the meas-
urement and verification of demand response 
The most accurate method for defining the demand response baseline used in 
measurement of demand response events was found to be the rolling average 
method. The individual variables regarding the timescale used for averaging, se-
lecting only a number of these days or circumstantial factors such as weekdays, 
consumer habits or weather are market specific. These factors should be clarified 
by experimenting different combinations using simulations based on the real mar-
ket data to discover the most accurate method to be adopted.  
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IX. Assess the risks of gaming and design policies to prevent harmful 
manipulation of the measurement and verification methods. 
It was concluded that there is a risk of demand response market participants gam-
ing the system for instance by freezing the baseline level with multiple actualized 
bids for the same hour during consequent days. The potential risks of exploiting 
the market should be investigated further and preventive measures should be ap-
plied. Special attention should also be given to the possibility of redesigning the 
rules, should new counterproductive loopholes be discovered by the participants. 
X. Encourage the adoption and knowledge regarding demand re-
sponse services among consumers 
Energiavirasto, among the other Nordic energy regulators has a role in promoting 
demand response services to achieve the benefits. When properly conducted, par-
ticipants could simply enjoy reduced electricity bills without even realizing that 
an event has occurred. These services could be promoted similarly as the regula-
tors are now promoting tendering the electricity contract or having hourly elec-
tricity pricing. The standardized contracts described above can also be considered 
as one method for encouraging the adoption and should thus be carefully designed. 
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